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Abstract 
  
The study was aimed at examining the interplay of emotion and three emotion-
functioning capacities in debiasing sunk-cost fallacy at trait-level.  An online survey was used 
to study 378 US adults and found that dispositional positive and negative affectivity, trait-
mindfulness, trait-EI and reappraisal were associated with debiasing sunk-cost fallacy.  
Among these factors, trait-mindfulness was found to be the most prominent attribute in 
association with debiasing sunk-cost fallacy.  A deeper review of the participants’ 
characteristics revealed that prolonged practice of mindfulness meditation fostered trait-
mindfulness, trait-EI and reappraisal in conjunction with upregulating dispositional positive 
affect and downregulating dispositional negative affect.  This study suggests that training 
which pays attention to the emotional underpinnings of decision biases and in particular 
mindfulness techniques may have greater promise.  The study also offers interesting insight 
for future research directions through which the tripartite emotion-functioning capacities can 
be better investigated. 
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Chapter One 
 
Aims and Objectives 
Financial decision-making is typically carried out under risk and uncertainty.  
Individuals’ cognitive evaluations of risk may differ from their emotional reactions to the 
risk.  When deciding on investments, rational decision-makers are expected to rely on their 
best estimates and/or available information about future consequences and not consider their 
already invested costs that cannot be recovered (Heilbroner and Thurow, 1981).  This 
cognitive, economic decision-making approach is termed the consequentialist perspective.  It 
assumes that decision-makers choose between alternative courses of action by assessing the 
utility (or desirability) and likelihood of their consequences, and integrating this information 
by expectation-based calculations to make a decision (Rick and Loewenstein, 2008).  
However, decision-makers tend to cling onto losing investments and increase their 
commitment by acquiring more of the failing investments, a behaviour known as the sunk-
cost fallacy (SCF, Arkes and Blumer, 1985). 
Sunk-cost situations do not just occur in investment decision-making but happen in 
people’s everyday life.   Decisions influenced by sunk-cost situations can be costly to an 
individual and such decision-making is likely to be irrational.  For example, US students are 
required to pay their education upfront and they largely continue their commitment to the 
course once this irrecoverable cost has been paid, regardless of whether the course is useful 
to them subsequently (Coleman, 2010). 
On the other hand, investment loss leads to negative emotion.   Emotion is a double-
edged sword because it can be adaptive or maladaptive.  Emotions are said to be maladaptive 
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when they are of the wrong type, come at the wrong time, or happen at the wrong intensity 
(Gross, 1998).  Here the right or wrong concept is relative rather than absolute.   Adaptive 
emotions can become situation-dependent. People normally regard negative moods as 
undesirable but they may not be wrong all the time.  For instance, sad individuals are found 
to be risk-acceptant whereas anxious individuals tend to be risk-averse (Raghunathan and 
Pham, 1999). If a risk-averse mindset is required in a particular situation, then becoming 
anxious for a limited time may be beneficial for the decision-makers. 
Whether the decision outcome is good or bad may depend on how decision-makers 
manage emotions.  Decision-makers are motivated to regulate their emotions in 
circumstances that have significant impacts now and for the future.  Since holding a failing 
investment is costly, any skills or strategies that can attenuate the SCF should be welcome.  
Managing emotions became a systematic study and has gathered momentum in the last two 
decades. Currently, Gross (2015) recognises the need to amalgamate other concepts with 
emotion regulation (ER), such as emotional intelligence (EI) and mindfulness.  The study 
proposes that effective application of these three emotion-functioning capacities may 
ultimately lead to greater psychological and financial well-being.   
  
Propositions  
Initially, the study proposes positive and negative affectivity as the primary locus in 
which rectifying or debiasing of SCF is performed when the relevant emotion is perceived.  
The tripartite emotion-functioning capacities come next in debiasing SCF.  As a facet of EI, 
ER seems to be the ability to explain individual differences in EI among people and how 
successful an individual is in using a particular form of ER.  Mindfulness is considered as a 
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facilitator for ER.  The theoretical underpinning for these propositions is that on one hand 
mindful presence (the focus on the present) and nonjudgmental acceptance conferred by 
mindfulness may facilitate the development of more effective ER, on the other hand the intra-
individual aspects of mood regulation and utilising emotions in EI transform individuals’ 
performance of ER.   Thus, an integrative study of emotions with the tripartite emotion-
functioning capacities in conjunction with debiasing SCF is warranted.  
The purpose of this study is to address the following research question: 
At trait level, can positive and negative affectivity, reappraisal, EI and mindfulness 
debias SCF, if so, what does each of them contribute to debiasing SCF? 
To answer the research question the study begins with a review of prior research and 
theory that underpin the cause of SCF, the characteristics of positive and negative affectivity, 
and the tripartite emotion-functioning capacities.  In conjunction with this review, the 
interconnectedness of all these attributes are examined.  Hypotheses are formulated on the 
basis of the specific functions that these attributes can plausibly achieve in connection with 
debiasing SCF. 
The study then goes on with an evaluation of research approach and methods.  This 
evaluation includes the rationale of using an online, self-reporting survey and the reasons 
why two possible alternative methods are rejected.  Potential biases and errors are examined 
at this design stage.  A feasible sample size is determined before the survey commences. 
When data are collected they are cleaned before they are used for analysis.  The 
various statistical analyses that follow are aimed at testing the hypotheses and explaining the 
relative importance of the attributes in connection with debiasing SCF.  The results are 
interpreted in the light of their theoretical implications.  The findings and their robustness are 
discussed in the final chapter.  
10 
 
  The study considers that at trait-level, trait-mindfulness instead of reappraisal appears 
to be responsible for maintaining a hedonic mood of higher dispositional positive affect and 
lower dispositional negative affect for decision-makers; second, trait-mindfulness seems to 
provide the locus for debiasing SCF largely because of the clarity provided by its retentive, 
accumulative capacity due to constant practice of mindfulness meditation.  These are the 
contributions of the study.   
The next chapter shows how hypotheses are derived from prior research and theory.   
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Chapter Two 
 
Literature Review  
In the domain of behavioural economics, the SCF is customarily explained by 
applying prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  This predicts that a decision-
maker who is in a losing position relative to their reference point tends to take more risk than 
those who are in a gain or neutral position relative to their reference point.  There are two 
cognitive biases1 embedded in such psychology.  The first bias is loss aversion which refers 
to decision-maker’s perception that “the disutility of giving up an object is greater than the 
utility associated with acquiring it” (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1991: p.194), which 
may result in the decision-maker’s escalating commitment (Staw, 1976) in anticipation of 
turning around a losing position2.  The second is status quo bias which is the decision-maker’s 
perspective that “the disadvantages of a change loom larger than its advantages” (Kahneman 
et al., 1991: p.200), and causes the decision-maker not to act on the failing investment.  In 
either event, the decision-maker will not realise a loss by selling the failing investment but 
continues to hold it without a rational evaluation of any expected value of the investment.  
Differences in individual mindsets result in disparities in people’s propensity to fall 
prey to SCF.  For example, people who take a retrospective focus on the past and ruminate 
                                                     
1 A cognitive bias refers to the deviation from rationality in judgment where inferences about situations 
are drawn against logic (Caverni, J-P., Fabre, J-M., and Gonzalez, M., 1990).  
 
2 Staw (1981) gave his personal experience of increased investment in a failing stock as an example.  
Of note, this behaviour is different from professional investors’ planned accumulation of a target 
investment in which they are convinced of the merit of the investment’s actual value and buy it when 
the investment is priced under a target price (calculated on basis of valid financial information).  
Typically, these investors use stop loss measure to avoid over-exposure and may sell the investment 
when its price rises beyond the target price. 
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about failure are more susceptible to the SCF than those who can let go of past events (van 
Putten, Zeelenberg and van Dijk, 2010).  Other than the sunk-costs that have resulted from a 
prior decision, estimated return or expected value of the investment created is also important 
in financial decision-making.  Therefore, a prospective focus on future consequences has 
been found to avoid or mitigate SCF (Tan and Yates, 1995).  However, Karlsson, Juliusson, 
Grankvist and Gärling (2002) found the contrary since such focus could paradoxically 
escalate irrational commitment, particularly when the anticipatory emotions (the 
instantaneous affective reaction to possible future events) about the accomplishment of a 
project are positive (Harvey and Victoravich, 2009).  There seems to be similar psychological 
processes implicated in this behaviour and that of investing more in a failing investment.   
 
SCF and decision-makers’ emotions  
Immediate emotion is formed at the moment of decision-making whereas expected 
emotion is experienced when the outcome of a decision materialises (Rick and Loewenstein, 
2008).  Emotion is considered as a short-lived but intense affective experience directed 
toward certain causes (Forgas, 1995).  Emotion contrasts with mood which is a prolonged 
and diffuse affective state unrelated with any particular causes (ibid).  Additionally, there are 
neurobiological bases for emotions.  For example, regret, the emotion which fuels loss 
aversion, appears to arise from amygdala activation (De Martino, Kumaran, Holt and Dolan, 
2009). 
The psychology of increasing commitment rather than withdrawal can also be 
explained by regret aversion, avoidance of regret or anticipated regret (Fenton-O'Creevy, 
Nicholson, Soane, and Willman, 2005; Wong and Kwong, 2007).  Regret “is a negative, 
cognitively based emotion that we experience when realizing or imagining that our present 
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situation would have been better, had we decided differently” (Zeelenberg, 1999: p.93).  
There are two facets of anticipated regret displayed in SCF.  Drawing on the mental 
accounting bias, regret may be put on hold when the loss is still on paper but regret will be 
experienced instantly when the failing investment is sold.  There is also the possibility of 
subsequent rise in investment price, following a sale, which will then aggravate the regret to 
be experienced.  Hence, the desire to avoid the anticipated regret becomes the decision-
maker’s immediate emotion which causes them to be more risk-acceptant than at the initial 
position so they continue to hold the failing investment (Summers and Duxbury, 2012). 
 
Positive and negative affectivity 
The disposition of positive affectivity is a trait that reflects individual differences in 
positive emotionality which explains the association between positive affect and greater 
satisfaction in life and improved health as positive affect changes how people perceive their 
inter-individual relationships and intra-individual well-being (Watson and Naragon, 2009).  
Dispositional positive affect is highly related to positive emotionality while dispositional 
negative affect is strongly correlated to negative emotionality (Watson and Clark, 1999).   
Negative affectivity is a “pervasive disposition that manifests itself even in the absence of 
any overt stress” (Watson and Clark, 1984: p.466).  Negative affectivity is found to be 
substantially related to trait anxiety under both stress and baseline conditions, which 
underpins that the negative affectivity construct originated by Watson and Clark (1984) 
reflects individual differences in negative mood and self-concept.  Such individual 
differences entail that people tend to act in certain ways and not in others (Gross, 2015).   
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Contrary to findings of Wong and Kwong (2007) as discussed earlier, negative affect 
is found to correlate negatively with escalation of commitment tendency for a decision-maker 
who is personally responsible for the outcome (Wong, Yik and Kwong, 2006).  Negative 
affect may either be caused by the negative feedback the decision-maker receives if they 
continue the same course of action (regret occurs upon further fall of investment price), or 
stem from cognitive dissonance3 if the decision-maker abandons prior action (Wong et al., 
2006).  In either event, the resulting negative affect is strong enough to dissuade the decision-
maker from the same course of action (ibid).   It seems that a twist in decision-maker’s 
perspective tilts the pointer of direction that the decision-maker is emotionally driven to 
behave.   
A decision-maker’s dispositional components of positive and negative affectivity are, 
by Forgas’s (1995) definition, decision-maker’s general mood.  Mood regulation is largely 
considered to be conducted automatically and without decision-maker’s conscious control 
(Mayer and Gaschke, 1988), therefore its effect may shape chronic differences in individuals’ 
cognitive processes.   The author suggests that people of high negative affect tend to feel, 
among others, nervous, ashamed and distressed over time, irrespective of whether or not there 
exists an overt stress.  They also show stronger emotional reactions to negative events.  These 
three elements of negative affect are deemed as components of regret emotion relevant to the 
current study.   
Positive affect and negative affect appear to display different relationships at trait and 
state levels.  They are negatively correlated at state level possibly due to situation-specific 
                                                     
3 Cognitive dissonance is a state of tension that occurs whenever an individual holds two inconsistent 
cognitions.  It happens when there is the need to justify an individual’s actions and decisions which 
are inconsistent with the individual’s beliefs (Festinger, 1957). 
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effects, and mutually independent at trait-level (Schmukle, Egloff and Burns, 2002).  Given 
the dispositional nature of positive and negative affectivity and the contrasting findings from 
Wong et al. (2006) and Wong and Kwong (2007), it seems likely that both or either affectivity 
predicts the way people behave before emotion trajectory is activated for debiasing SCF.  
This is investigated by the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1).  Dispositional positive and negative affectivity will be associated 
with sunk-cost fallacy such that the higher the dispositional positive affect and the 
lower the dispositional negative affect, the lower the propensity to exhibit the sunk-
cost fallacy. 
 
Emotion regulation  
ER refers to “altering an emotion trajectory that would have occurred in the absence 
of that emotion regulation strategy, and different regulation strategies and tactics should alter 
the emotion trajectory in different ways” (Gross, 2015: p7).  Previous research has found that 
individuals can improve decision-making efficacy by managing their emotions (see Heilman, 
Crisan, Houser, Miclea and Miu, 2010; Sokol-Hessner, Camerer, and Phelps, 2013).  
Empirically, Fenton-O’Creevy, Lins, Vohra, Richards, Davies, and Schaaff (2012) 
investigated traders’ ability in regulating emotions at times of market turmoil and found that 
heart rate variability, a biological marker of task-related ER, positively correlated to trader 
expertise and negatively correlated to market volatility.  It seems that cognitive biases 
embedded in SCF is induced partly by affects arising when receiving the negative feedback 
on the prior investment decision, and partly by the processes these affects generate.  Together 
they act as the drivers of decision outcomes behind the scene.   
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ER is a collection of processes that people use to influence when, what and how 
emotions arise, experienced and expressed (Gross and Thompson, 2007).  ER processes have 
two components: antecedent-focused (before emotional responses become fully activated) 
strategies of situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment and cognitive 
change, and response-focused (after emotion responses have been activated) response 
modulation.  Appendix-1 shows the process model of ER originated by Gross (1998).   
The attentional deployment process of rumination refers to directed attention to 
feelings and consequences (Gross, 1998).  By contrast, attention allocation can be used to 
select new situations and modify imagined situations (Gross, 1998).  Reappraisal, a cognitive 
change process, involves cognitive re-evaluation of situations or stimuli so as to change 
emotions early in the emotion-generative process (Gross and John, 2003).  Reappraisal 
typically causes a decrease in negative affect experience and expression, and the effect is 
more significant in reappraising an emotional stimulus or using perspective-taking than 
reappraising an emotional response (Webb, Miles, and Sheeran, 2012).  Other cognitive 
change processes include acceptance which refers to the decision-maker’s acknowledging 
the event encountered and their incapacity to deal with it in situations that cannot be 
modified, such as a failing investment.  Expressive suppression, a response modulation 
process, entails effortful inhibition of unwanted emotions, yet it rarely changes negative 
affect (Peña-Sarrionandia, Mikolajczak, and Gross, 2015).  Typically, antecedent-focused ER 
processes are considered more effective than response-focused processes because the former 
changes the trajectory of an emotion early in the emotion-generative process (Gross and John, 
2003). 
People who fall prey to SCF are unable to select or modify the situation because they 
have already invested money in a prior decision.  Therefore, this study does not consider 
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situation selection and modification.  Since emotion is experienced at state-level rather than 
trait-level for response-modulation regulation, the latter is not considered here.  Other 
antecedent-focused processes, namely attentional deployment and cognitive change, appear 
to be the relevant processes that relate to management of individuals’ emotions with regard 
to debiasing SCF.   Although ER processes of attention and acceptance bear the same names 
as two of the key components of mindfulness, each of them has different meaning in its 
applications when used as an ER process and in mindfulness setting.  Therefore, it is more 
appropriate to investigate them under mindfulness.   
Reappraisal is emphasised in this study because it can alter the emotional impact by 
changing the situational meaning of a stimulus thereby reducing some bias in decision-
making.  Thus, in a study of bank traders in London, Fenton-O'Creevy, Soane, Nicholson, 
and Willman (2011) found that high-performing, experienced traders typically applied 
reappraisal, rather than situation avoidance or expressive suppression, to facilitate decision-
making and outperformed in their investments.  Likewise, the study of Sokol-Hessner, Hsu, 
Curley, Delgado, Camerer, and Phelps (2009) gave participants reappraisal instructions of 
perspective-taking (“thinking like a trader”) and found that such instructions (relative to a 
control group) significantly reduced participants’ loss aversion, a major component of SCF.   
The author suggests that by paying attention to the things that help them feel positive 
emotions, decision-makers do not ruminate their past mistake but instead use perspective-
taking to effect a cognitive change, for example, by assuming that they are still in the initial 
position without having committed the initial decision.  This would give them clarity in 
deciding rationally whether to hold or sell the failing investment by applying the 
consequentialist approach.  This argument, together with empirical evidence reviewed above 
suggests that reappraisal is positively related to debiasing SCF: 
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Hypothesis 2 (H2).  Reappraisal will be associated with sunk-cost fallacy such that 
the higher the use of reappraisal the lower the propensity to exhibit the sunk-cost 
fallacy. 
 
Mindfulness 
Mindfulness as a state of mind is sometimes considered as an attentional deployment 
process in the ER family (see Appendix-1) but it should be regarded as a stand-alone 
cognitive mindset which involves a number of related qualities.  In Buddhist psychology 
Samadhi and Vipassana are two profoundly aspired attainments.  Samadhi refers to in-depth 
concentration which entails the unificatory focus of the mind on its object, whereas 
Vipassana is the insight into impermanence, suffering and non-self nature of sentient beings 
(Dreyfus, 2011).  Other than these two eudaemonist and soteriological practices, mindfulness 
as an intervention technique largely consists of consciousness (having interconnected 
functions of awareness and attention), experiencing present reality, clarity4, and non-
judgmental acceptance (Brown and Ryan, 2003, 2004).  Non-judgmental acceptance begins 
with non-judgmental observing and then accepting of whatever arises within the stream of 
consciousness (Dreyfus, 2011).   Non-judgmental acceptance goes further than acceptance in 
ER, for instance, being able to be compassionate with oneself when things go wrong is a 
crucial attribute that non-judgmental acceptance confers.  Since awareness comprises of ER 
components such as increased attentional deployment and cognitive change, and decreased 
expressive suppression, an individual’s awareness of their emotion and the knowledge of how 
                                                     
4 Clarity includes perceptual clarity about individual’s emotional states (Brown and Ryan, 2003). 
Clarity is also linked with EI as postulated by Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, and Palfai (1995).   
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it emerges enable them to determine whether it is in their best interest to regulate the emotion 
that has arisen (Farb, Anderson, Irving, and Segal, 2014).   
Mindfulness is found to increase positive affect and decrease negative affect (Peña-
Sarrionandia et al., 2015).  Similarly, people report that they are happier when they focus on 
mindful presence than when they ponder about the past or the future (Killingsworth and 
Gilbert, 2010).  Mindfulness meditation is practised to focus the present moment and draw 
attention away from the past and future.  It also increases clarity and non-judgmental 
acceptance.  Hence, mindfulness meditation is used as a transformational practice for 
rectifying maladaptive cognitive habits by adaptive ones (Dreyfus, 2011).  Since mindfulness 
can be acquired by constant practice of meditation, some renowned traders practise noticing 
thoughts and emotions that are embedded in their decision-making, and identify 
disadvantageous patterns in their behaviour so that they can devise measures to rectify such 
behaviour.  For example, CEO Gross of PIMCO uses daily meditative practice to cultivate 
self-awareness (Peterson, 2014).   
Constant practice of meditation increases trait-mindfulness (Kiken, Garland, Bluth, 
Palsson, and Gaylord, 2015).  Trait-mindfulness refers to the general tendency that an 
individual displays the non-judgmental awareness of present-moment experience in everyday 
life (Hanley, Garland, and Black, 2013).  Since a focus on the past or future may increase 
susceptibility to SCF as discussed, then a focus on the present may attenuate such 
susceptibility.  Moreover, mindfulness is found to debias SCF at trait and state levels 
(Hafenbrack, Kinias, and Barsade, 2014).  Hence, the debiasing effect is hypothesized at trait-
level as follows: 
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Hypothesis 3 (H3). Trait-mindfulness will be associated with sunk-cost fallacy such 
that the higher the trait-mindfulness the lower the propensity to exhibit the sunk-cost 
fallacy. 
Mindful ER refers to the capacity to constantly remain mindfully aware, however, it 
is not a straight combination of mindfulness and any ER processes such as reappraisal and 
expressive suppression (Chambers, Gullone, and Allen, 2009).  Reappraisal as a cognitive 
change process may result in avoidance of experience in circumstances where the use of 
reappraisal is driven by an unwillingness to risk experiencing or remain in contact with a 
particular negative emotion in relation to the initial appraisal (Chambers et al., 2009), for 
example, decision-maker’s anticipated regret as discussed.   As caveats, avoidance of both 
pleasant and unpleasant emotional experiences may be potentially harmful while acceptance 
of emotional experiences (an element of mindfulness) is beneficial (Chambers et al., 2009).   
By contrast, mindful reappraisal includes non-judgmental acceptance which alters decision-
maker's relationship to these emotional experiences by learning to accept, instead of 
reflexively acting on, thoughts and emotions, for example, mindful decision-makers admit 
their mistakes without taking the mistakes too personally so that anticipated regret is relieved.  
Additionally, being able to be open to the experience of the present reality is helpful to those 
decision-makers who tend to be regretful of their past mistakes.  On the other hand, 
expressive suppression is antithetical to mindfulness because the former inhibits rather than 
enhances awareness and acceptance of emotional experiences (Chambers et al., 2009).    
A significant body of research supports the view that individual differences in 
mindfulness are predictive of neurobiological processes underlying emotion-processing.  
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex activation [also a neurobiological correlate of reappraisal 
according to Sokol-Hessner et al. (2013)] is found to be positively associated with individual 
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differences in trait-mindfulness, which suggests that trait-mindfulness is positively 
associated with reappraisal success (Modinos, Ormel and Aleman, 2010).   Also, mindfulness 
fosters adaptive ER processes to act by initiating, modifying, or maintaining positive affect 
and negative affect in response to changing environmental settings, which in turn influences 
experiential, behavioural and physiological attempts in regulating experienced emotions 
(Chambers et al., 2009). 
Given the foregoing arguments particularly those that support hypotheses 2 and 3, it 
is probable that trait-mindfulness acts as a moderator which affects the strength and/or 
direction of reappraisal in debiasing SCF.  Thus, the study tests: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4).  The relationship between lowering the propensity to exhibit sunk-
cost fallacy and reappraisal will be stronger for higher levels of trait mindfulness. 
 
Emotional intelligence 
EI is a collection of adaptive abilities for emotion-functioning, characterised by 
individual differences (Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso, 2004).  The collection is differentiated 
into four branches in their model5: i) perception of emotion in oneself and others, ii) using 
emotion to facilitate decision-making, iii) understanding emotion in oneself and others, and 
iv) managing emotion in oneself and others.  EI is found to improve intra-individual and 
inter-individual functioning that benefits ER functioning, which is evidenced by lowered 
                                                     
5 The operationalisation of EI as an ability model suggests that people need to demonstrate skill in 
these four branches in order to be considered emotionally intelligent.  This is different from other EI 
approaches which are not dealt with in this study, for example, Goleman’s (1998) competence model. 
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cortisol secretion, a neurobiological marker of reappraisal (Kotsou, Nelis, Grégoire, and 
Mikolajczak, 2011).   
Mestre, MacCann, Guil and Roberts (2016) theorise that ER provides the mechanism 
by which EI influences decision outcomes.  They analysed the relative strength of linkage 
between ER processes and EI as abilities, as shown in Appendix-2.  The intersection between 
ER and EI shows significant inter-correlations between attention, acceptance and reappraisal.   
Expressive suppression appears to have no correlation with EI (see Appendix-2).  These 
claims are in congruence with the findings of Gross and John (2003) as discussed earlier.  
Hence, expressive suppression is not considered in this research.   
Whereas state-EI denotes the situation when EI abilities are performed, trait-EI6 is 
defined as “the propensity to behave in a certain way in emotional situations” (Mikolajczak, 
2009: p.27).  When the application of adaptive emotion-functioning is used in daily life, both 
ability and trait operationalisations have utility.  Trait-EI’s performance-based measures are 
considered preferable for research settings (Schutte, Manes, and Malouff, 2009).  This 
outcome-oriented approach for trait-EI is in accord with Mayer et al.’s (2004) model and 
appears to be predictive of decision-maker’s style of how emotions are managed.    
As argued earlier, it seems likely that susceptibility to SCF depends on how decision-
makers manage their emotions.  Low trait-EI people are more prone to behave or react in a 
less adaptive manner than the high trait-EI counterparts, that is, they tend to be more 
influenced by the outcome of a prior investment hence more affected by the emotions arising 
                                                     
6 This definition is different from that of Petrides and Furnham (2003: p.40) which construes trait-EI 
as “a constellation emotion-related self-perceptions and dispositions”.  The latter definition emphasises 
personality traits which was not in accord with Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso (2008).  
 
 
23 
 
from its failing performance.  Therefore, the study suggests that trait-EI relates to debiasing 
SCF:       
Hypothesis 5 (H5).  Trait-EI will be associated with sunk-cost fallacy such that the 
higher the trait-EI the lower the propensity to exhibit the sunk-cost fallacy. 
While ER concerns how emotions can be managed, EI focuses on, among others, 
understanding individual differences in ER, and explains why high levels of EI are related to 
better emotion-related outcomes (Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015).  People are said to exercise 
intelligent ER if they can use ER in a manner that is adaptive and consistent with their goals 
(Wranik, Barrett, and Salovey, 2007; Peña-Sarrionandia et al., 2015).  Trait-EI appears to 
shape individual preferences, attentional focus and motives, which collectively tend to 
influence the choice of ER processes (Côté, DeCelles, McCarthy, van Kleef, and Hideg, 
2011).  Accordingly, people with higher trait-EI use more reappraisal processes than lower 
trait-EI people (Schutte et al., 2009).  It follows that people tend to promote the emotions 
they desire or prevent themselves from experiencing emotions they try to avoid.  Further, the 
arguments supporting hypotheses 2 and 5 lead the author to test whether trait-EI moderates 
the relationship between reappraisal and debiasing SCF. 
Hypothesis 6 (H6).  The relationship between lowering the propensity to exhibit sunk-
cost fallacy and reappraisal will be stronger for higher level of trait-EI. 
Hypothesis 3 is formulated on the basis of established evidence on both trait and state 
levels.  It is put to test in order to confirm whether the concept used is replicable.  More 
valuable contributions, such as the strengths of positive and negative affectivity as compared 
with the tripartite emotion-functioning capacities in connection with debiasing SCF at trait-
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level, would be anticipated in this study. Figure-1 below illustrates the path model of the six 
hypotheses to be examined: 
 
Figure-1 The Path Model of Hypotheses 
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Control variables 
There is evidence for the role of self-esteem in relation to SCF.  Threatened self-
esteem can cause escalation of commitment (Zhang and Baumeister, 2006) while self-
affirmation interventions to preserve participants’ self-esteem can de-escalate their 
commitments to a failing cause (Sivanathan, Molden, Galinsky, and Ku, 2008).  Self-esteem 
is found to mediate the relationship between trait-EI and life satisfaction, since people with 
higher EI manage their emotions well therefore they tend to increase their self-esteem and 
consequently greater life satisfaction (Kong, Zhao and You, 2012).  All these claims lead to 
the inclusion of self-esteem as a control factor. 
Older adults are found to be less susceptible to SCF than younger adults (Bruine de 
Bruin, Parker, and Fischhoff, 2007).  Younger adults are found to weigh negative information 
more seriously than positive information (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, and Vohs, 
2001) while older adults place greater weight on positive information than negative 
information (Carstensen and Mikels, 2005).  Since the argument centres on evaluation of 
information, the study will include education and income levels as control variables in 
addition to age.  Education level also relates to cognitive ability while income bracket 
represents socioeconomic status.  Meditation experience is another relevant variable since it 
increases trait-mindfulness the longer an individual practises meditation.  Gender difference 
in sunk-cost situations is unknown, therefore, gender is included as one of the control 
variables together with self-esteem, age, education level, income level and mindfulness 
meditation experience in this research.   
The next chapter outlines the study method and sample. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Methods of Data Collection 
 The methodology used in this study is inferential survey which assumes a positivist 
stance next in strength to scientific experiment.  Positivism has the key concepts “that (the) 
social world exists externally, and that its properties should be measured through objective 
method” (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2015: p.339).  Hence, inferential survey aims 
at establishing meaningful relationships between key variables and concepts from findings 
of a cross-sectional study.  It is an explanatory research which has a logic of enquiry 
embedded in an induction-deduction model.  Hypotheses are tested before they are allowed 
or disproved (Potter, 2006).  The survey was conducted through the internet, arranged by 
Qualtrics with which the Open University has an operating contract.  Online survey is a 
commonplace method for research because of the wide coverage and face validity accorded 
to the research method.   
There are two main alternative methods that have been used to study emotions: 
scientific experiment and qualitative case study. Scientific experiment, the strongest form of 
positivist approach, is used in, among others, affective bioscience, cognitive psychology and 
behavioural economics.  A particular advantage is that it allows study of physiological 
markers of emotion-functioning (for instance, neurobiological evidences for ER, EI and 
mindfulness as discussed in Chapter 2) by using high-tech equipment or techniques such as 
fMRI (Peterson, 2014).  Another advantage is that it provides better opportunities for 
inferring causality than survey methods.  However, access to participants can be opportunistic 
and sample size (number of participants to be studied) will be generally small.  Another 
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disadvantage for scientific experiment as such is the requirement of intensive resources. 
Since there exists bioscientific interconnectedness of the three emotion-functioning 
capacities, a scientific experiment to test the six hypotheses at trait-level will not be cost 
effective because the current study does not require an external stimulus to trigger a course 
of actions or an emotion trajectory.    
A qualitative case study is conducted largely by using a constructivist approach of 
interviewing participants to obtain data.  Since researchers cannot understand participants’ 
emotions and meanings purely by observation (a realist approach), a constructivist approach 
where understanding is socially constructed by researchers and the researched, is used.  This 
is an explicatory research adopting an abductive logic of enquiry, which entails “constructing 
new theory rather than testing it, by […] identifying naturally occurring surprises or 
deliberately creating them” (Potter, 2006: p.86).  Again, access to participants can be 
problematic and sample size is expected to be small.  Although Fenton-O'Creevy et al. (2011) 
offered a striking example of conducting a qualitative research in massive scale by studying 
118 traders using thematic analysis on data collected from interviews, this research was time-
consuming and resource-demanding.  On the other hand, a case study confining to a small 
group of participants will not provide sufficient legitimacy or representation to support the 
tripartite interactions of emotion-functioning.  The emphasis of the current study is on theory-
testing of hypotheses, not constructing new theories with participants.    
Having considered the inadequacy of the alternative methods relative to the time and 
resources available to the author, the current research adopted online survey methods to study 
381 adults in America.  Recruiting US participants was more cost effective than using UK 
participants. Also, the measures used had already been validated by US samples with item 
28 
 
language appropriate to that context.  The author was not required to be present in America 
to administer the survey thanks to the internet.  Participant identity was ensured by 
comprehensive procedures such as digital fingerprinting and their demographics were 
verified by Qualtrics’s panel providers.   
  
Ethics  
Participants were recruited through designated panels used by Qualtrics who charged 
an agreed rate per complete response.  The participants were incentivised to respond by 
redeemable points accumulated from completing various surveys they responded to.  This 
did not constitute an unreasonably strong inducement to participants (Oliver, 2003) because 
the amount they received per survey was low.  As panel participants have freedom to choose 
the surveys they respond to, they could also withdraw at any point in the survey and were 
explicitly reminded of this right.  Participant anonymity and confidentiality were ensured 
because the administration of the questionnaire was performed online through Qualtrics’ 
system where researchers did not have access at their ends.  Having no researcher-participant 
interaction serendipitously alleviates potential bias of social desirability caused by 
researcher-administered survey (discussed in a later section). Additionally, the University’s 
ethics procedures included screening of the questionnaire to guard against sensitive 
questions.  This was a procedure to protect participants from possible harm (Oliver, 2003). 
The research followed the major ethical principles advised by Oliver (2003), for example, 
obtaining informed consent from participants before the survey commences.  It was also for 
the author’s benefit to use clear and validated questions for the study.  Equally important to 
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participants was the low time cost involved in the research as it took about ten minutes to 
complete the survey. 
 
Measurement 
A survey is a quantitative research method which typically applies quantification, 
sampling and comparison in a standardised setting (Sapsford, 2007).  The survey collected 
quantified data of performance measures for debiasing sunk-cost (via scenario-based 
decisions) and trait-level behavioural measures such as mindfulness and EI.  Six sets of 
measures, each of which had been validated in previous research, were produced for the 
research.  Appendix-3(i) displays the full set of questionnaire items.  Column three denotes 
the scale or measure that the item belongs to.  Questions 3 to 37 were items of the six primary 
measures.  All of them were extracted from the original measures with amendments discussed 
in a later section.  Questions 1, 2, and 38 to 42 contained six control variables and a quality 
check question.   
Dependent variable  
Sunk-cost Bias: In an online survey, resistance to sunk-cost can only be measured by self-
report questions.  Since the author replicated and extended Hafenbrack et al.’s (2014) 
correlational study therefore he followed their use of the sunk-cost measures originated by 
Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007), which he obtained directly from the lead researcher. The author 
shortened the scale to reduce the burden on respondents and adopted seven out of the ten 
items by judging their face validity, for example, Question 3 draws on the disutility of eating 
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extra bites of the dessert against the already committed cost of ordering it.  Question 5 
involved money therefore the numbers were adjusted for inflation over the last ten years.   
The answers ranged from 1 = most likely to escalate the prior commitment to 7 = most 
likely resist the sunk-cost bias.  This scale was reversed to form a measure of Debiasing SCF.  
Appendix-3(ii) displays the answers in detail. 
Independent variables  
Trait-mindfulness: As the study of Schutte and Malouff (2011) found association between EI 
and mindfulness therefore the mindfulness measures used by them, a short form (14-items) 
of Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory used in Kohls, Sauer, and Walach (2009), were reviewed 
and eight of the fourteen items were adopted.  They were mindful presence and non-
judgmental acceptance (four items in each dimension), which were the two most relevant 
dimensions to the study. 
Trait-EI: The author reviewed factor loadings obtained from factor analysis for the Self-
report EI Scale (originated by Schutte, Malouff, Hall, Haggerty, Cooper, Golden, and 
Dornheim, 1998) carried out by Goldenberg, Matheson, and Mantler (2006), and selected 
items of the top 4 scores from each set of measures for Mood Regulation and Utilising 
Emotions.   
ER: The six reappraisal measures were obtained from the canonical Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire (Gross and John, 2003).   
Dispositional positive and negative affectivity: Watson, Clark and Tellegen (1988) developed 
the 20-item positive and negative affect scales (PANAS scales) and later an expanded form, 
the 60-item PANAS-X (Watson and Clark, 1999).  The brief PANAS scales have been 
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robustly used and tested as self-reported measures for positive and negative affectivity, for 
example, Schutte and Malouff (2011) and Hafenbrack et al. (2014). The expanded form 
breaks positive and negative affects down to low-order measures, which are reported to 
exhibit high validity and stability, and are used as measures for either short-term (state) or 
long-term (trait) instructions (Watson and Clark, 1999).   In this study, items selected from 
the brief PANAS scales which prescribed general positive affects antithetical to regret were 
compared with the lower-order measures from the expanded PANAS-X scales.  Positive 
affect measures “enthusiastic” from basic positive emotion scales of Joviality, “proud” from 
Self-assurance, and “determined” from Attentiveness (Watson and Clark, 1999: p.2) were 
chosen as antithetical to regret.  Negative affect measures used were those specific for regret: 
nervous, ashamed and distressed.  These six items were adopted in the study.   
All measures used in the current study were in the form of attitudinal data.  Attitudinal 
data are not naturally-occurring as they are not collected from interactions or behaviour that 
would happen even if such collection was not there.  Schwarz (1999) argues that attitude 
measurement is context-dependent, for example, question order and context may shape the 
answers.  Online survey does not allow participants to go back to previous questions so the 
notion that subsequent questions influence preceding ones does not apply to the present study.  
This question order effect is further evaluated in the next section on common method bias.  
Cognitive interviewing entails that originators of questionnaire should know how participants 
think and feel about the questions to be answered (Schwarz, 1999).  To this end, the study 
first adopted validated measures from relevant research which had proven construct validity.  
Second, five fellow students were asked to pilot-test the content validity of the questionnaire.  
Among them three lived in America before. They reviewed the English language used in all 
measures (largely written in American English) to check whether it was understandable to 
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them.  The author found that there was no need to change the tone or words except changing 
the pronouns and related tenses from first person to second person singular to maintain 
consistency.   
For all the predictor variables, participants were asked to rank the extent of agreement 
or frequency in their responses, for example, answers for Question 11 ranged from 1 = 
strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.  In order to ensure comparability among various 
measures of different lengths, the Likert-scale used from questions 3 to 38 was extended to 
a uniform 7-point scale (the maximum points of all measures) for all measures except control 
variables because longer and balanced (equidistant) scales offer maximum flexibility and 
reliability (Darbyshire and McDonald, 2004).  To streamline the bulky Rosenberg (1979) 
self-esteem scale (10-items), a single item self-esteem measure was used instead according 
to a recommendation by Robins, Hendin and Trzesniewski (2001).  
Another problem for attitudinal data is that researchers are expecting certain answers 
(for example, up-regulate positive emotion) and the researched may know what answers are 
expected (Sapsford, 2007).  It is normal for participants to respond pleasantly rather than 
unpleasantly to be seen as behaving rationally or emotionally balanced.  This is a social 
desirability effect which is considered as "the tendency of some people to respond to items 
more as a result of their social acceptability than their true feelings" (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 
Lee, and Podsakoff, 2003: p.882).  As discussed earlier, social desirability is mitigated in a 
self-administered survey.  There is also the risk of self-selection bias but is considered 
negligible as the survey invitation sent by Qualtrics’s panels does not include detailed 
contents of the survey.   In view of other potential biases in attitudinal data attributed to 
individual differences, the author reviewed research on method effects and appropriate 
strategies for minimising these biases, especially common method bias.   
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Potential biases and errors 
Method effects refer to participants’ propensity to biasedly respond to questionnaire 
based on criteria other than its intended content, resulting in systematic variance that is 
unrelated to the study, for examples, social desirability and acquiescence (saying yes or no 
without due regard of the context) (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  Taking Hypothesis 2 as an 
example, the measurement of debiasing SCF is considered to correlate with the measurement 
of reappraisal.  When the measures of debiasing SCF and measures of reappraisal are 
obtained by the same method, this method may cause a systematic effect on the observed 
correlation between measures, a phenomenon known as common method bias.  There are 
two schools of thoughts on this bias.  For some scholars, common method bias is considered 
as a general problem for measures obtained from the same source, in particular the 
participants themselves because the observed relationship between the independent variable 
and dependent variable could be upwardly biased (Podsakoff et al., 2003), or attenuated on 
the contrary (Conway and Lance, 2010).  Since each set of performance measures (dependent 
variables) and behavioural measures (independent variables) are obtained from the same 
participant who rates their attitudes on a self-report basis, common method is relevant in this 
study, which may entail artefactual covariance between the independent and dependent 
variables. Covariance reflects the degree to which two variables vary together (Howell, 
2007). 
Although Conway and Lance (2010) agree that the use of different methods is 
preferred to the use of common method for different constructs, they argue that adversity of 
the bias against research findings should not be exaggerated.  They produce a list of counter-
arguments against misconceptions about common method bias and approaches to mitigate its 
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risks.  Accordingly, the author used procedures recommended by Conway and Lance (2010), 
as follows:  First, it is reasonable to expect that self-reports are appropriate in situations where 
participants’ perceptions are studied.  This claim accords with the current study where 
attitudes or opinions as perceived by participants are asked, since they are the most suitable 
source to answer.  Second, as conceptual overlap in items used to measure different 
constructs can prejudice relationships among variables, lack of overlap in items for different 
constructs can ameliorate potential bias.  For example, the study did not use items to measure 
attention in the emotion regulation construct in order to avoid conceptual overlap for mindful 
presence in the mindfulness construct.  Third, procedural remedies formulated at the design 
stage of the research to minimise threats of method effects, including among others, (a) 
temporal, proximal, psychological, or methodological separation of measurement, (b) 
counterbalancing question order, and (c) protecting respondent anonymity and reducing 
evaluation apprehension (Podsakoff et al., 2003: pp.887-8).  Example for procedure (a) was 
the segregation of sunk-cost questionnaire from other measures by placing the former as the 
beginning part of survey so that participants did not notice how the performance measures 
were related to the behavioural measures as they progressed on.  Since the rationale for 
procedure (b) is to control priming effects (that is, exposure to one measure affects the 
response to another measure), all measures other than debiasing SCF were reshuffled so as 
to neutralise method biases as far as possible [Appendix-3(i)].  As for procedure (c), 
participant anonymity is ensured in a self-administered online survey where participants have 
no face-to-face interactions with researchers.   
Conway and Lance (2010) particularly do not recommend post-hoc statistical control 
strategies because on one hand suitable statistical methods such as multitrait-multimethod 
matrix are resource intensive to apply, and on the other hand generally known methods are 
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neither effective nor capable of reducing common method bias, for example, Harrow’s one-
factor method.  As caveats, same-method correlations may overestimate relationships which 
results in Type-I error, while different-method correlations may underestimate relationships 
leading to Type-II error.  Type-I error is the incorrect rejection of a true null hypothesis (H0) 
while a Type-II error is incorrectly retaining a false H0 (Howell, 2007).  It is desirable to 
contain Type-II error exposure by having high power in research, rather than using post-hoc 
methods (Conway and Lance, 2010). 
 
Sample 
Findings of the research were subjected to statistical tests which could produce either 
significant or non-significant results.  A non-significant result is attributed to either correctly 
rejecting the alternative hypothesis (H1) or the test is not sufficiently powerful to detect the 
deviations from the H0 when the H1 is true.  Mayr, Erdfelder, Buchner, and Faul (2007) offer 
a tutorial for G*Power as the tool for a priori power analysis to determine the required sample 
size N of a test given a desired α level, a desired power level (1 - β), and the effect size to be 
detected (that is, the difference between the H0 and the H1).  From the various literature that 
supported the hypotheses, Hafenbrack et al.’s (2014) correlational study was regarded as the 
pivotal research, therefore Pearson's correlation coefficient (r = .205) found in the research 
and probability value (α = .01, rounded up from the research) were used to calculate the 
sample size using the G*Power 3.1.9.2 programme.  The study adopted the commonly used 
confidence level of 95% and one-tailed assumption (as hypotheses are unidirectional), and 
arrived at 367 as the required sample size.  Appendix-4 shows the priori calculation.  This 
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prior evaluation of required sample size is important since a sufficient sample is required to 
achieve reliability and validity of findings (Sapsford, 2007).   
The next chapter deals with how collected data were compared and analysed.  Various 
statistical methods were deployed in the analysis, aided by SPSS software.  Correlations and 
reliability statistics were applied to check inter-relationships and internal consistency of data.  
Multiple regression was performed to test the predictor and control variables, and the 
moderation model.  Then dominance analysis was run to assess the relative importance of 
the predictor variables that explain debiasing SCF.  Additionally, the sample’s characteristics 
are discussed alongside with demographic analysis.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Collecting and Analysing the Data 
The survey was launched in mid-June 2017 after the pilot-test had been conducted 
and evaluated.  A quota system was set against the number of participants in different gender 
and age groups so as to achieve a balanced sample.  During the course of data collection the 
author spotted some participants had finished the survey in very short time therefore he 
cleaned out these data by setting a time threshold of 3 minutes for admitting a complete 
response.   In early-July 381 complete responses were secured, of which 191 were female 
and 190 were male.  The size of individual age groups was relatively even: 21-29 (N = 78), 
30-39 (N = 88), 40-49 (N = 59), with the 50+ group more prominent (N = 156).  The set-up 
of quota succeeded in achieving a balanced sample for analysis. 
Homoscedasticity and normality are the two basic assumptions for correlation and 
regression (Howell, 2007).  Having satisfied homoscedasticity in Bartlett's test of sphericity 
(X2 ≈ 6,426, p < .0005, obtained from an initial test using Exploratory Factor Analysis), tests 
of normality was conducted for sunk-cost/reappraisal bivariate [Appendix-5(i)] and sunk-
cost/EI bivariate [Appendix-6(i)].  Three outliers were found at the lower left corner of the 
normal Q-Q plot of Studentized residual for both bivariates, albeit Shapiro-Wilk test showed 
that normality was barely significant for sunk-cost/reappraisal bivariate (p = .056) and sunk-
cost/EI bivariate  (p = .055).     
The three basic diagnostic tests generally used to detect outliers are distance, leverage 
and influence (Howell, 2007).  Given the obvious evidence for three distant outliers, the 
author compared values of Studentized residuals (SREs) and Studentized deleted residuals 
(SDRs) for the sunk-cost/reappraisal bivariate and the sunk-cost/EI bivariate.  SRE and SDR 
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values of more than three-fold of their respective (negative) standard deviation (σ) were 
found from three common participants.  In normal distribution, the three-sigma rule 
(Pukelsheim, 1994) predicts that approximately one in 370 observations will differ by ±3σ 
or more from the mean.  The probability to have three observations over ±3σ or more from 
the mean should have happened in a sample of 1,111 instead of 381.  Data from these three 
participants were considered as outliers.  Table-1 below exhibits some details of the outliers: 
 
Table-1 Outliers’ scores, Studentized residuals and Studentized deleted residuals 
Participant's 
IP Address 
Sunk 
cost 
(SC) 
Mindful 
Presence 
Non-
judgmental 
Acceptance EI 
Reappraisal 
(Re) 
Positive 
Affect 
Negative 
Affect 
SRE-
SC/EI 
SDR-
SC/EI 
SRE-
SC/Re 
SDR-
SC/Re 
38.XXX.78 1.140 7.000 6.750 7.000 6.330 6.670 2.000 -3.449 -3.500 -3.367 -3.415 
65.XXX.28 1.140 7.000 6.250 7.000 7.000 6.670 3.670 -3.449 -3.500 -3.414 -3.463 
97.XXX.170 1.430 6.000 6.500 6.130 6.830 7.000 6.330 -3.075 -3.110 -3.111 -3.147 
 
Outliers are largely caused by three reasons: data entry and/or measurement errors, 
intentional mis-reporting, and genuinely unusual values (Osborne and Overbay, 2004).  
Possibility of data entry and/or measurement errors was low thanks to the electronic data 
processing method used in online survey.  Intentional mis-reporting could happen if 
participants wanted to demonstrate that they managed their emotion well- the social 
desirability effect.  Given the odds against three unusual values, the author excluded these 
outliers from the rest of the analysis.  By using adjusted data to re-run the tests of normality 
for the sunk-cost/reappraisal bivariate [Appendix-5(ii), p = .385] and sunk-cost/EI bivariate 
[Appendix-6(ii), p = .543], the three outliers disappeared from the normal Q-Q plot of 
Studentized residual. 
Cronbach's alpha was used to test the reliability or internal consistency of multiple 
Likert-scale items in the questionnaire.  Questions were grouped under their respective 
dimensions and the pairwise mean of each measure/dimension was calculated. Table-2 below 
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shows Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of the individual scores for the seven 
measures/dimensions.  According to Sapsford (2007) Alpha coefficient of 0.60 or higher is 
considered acceptable for attitudinal data, as in the case of the incumbent survey.  
Also shown in Table-2 are the Pearson’s correlations among the seven measures 
which provide a test of the four correlational hypotheses:  H1 was supported as debiasing 
SCF positively correlated to positive affect (r = .128) while inversely correlated to negative 
affect (r = -.190).  H2 was supported because there was positive correlation between 
reappraisal and debiasing SCF (r = .102). H3 was partially supported because dispositional 
non-judgmental acceptance did not correlate with debiasing SCF while only dispositional 
mindful presence positively correlated with debiasing SCF (.193).  This result was 
comparable to Hafenbrack et al.’s (2014) finding of trait-mindfulness/debiasing SCF 
correlation (r = .205, p < .005).  H5 was supported because there was positive correlation 
between trait-EI and debiasing SCF (.118).  
Table-2 Correlations and Cronbach’s Coefficients 
Variable Debiasing 
sunk-cost 
Mindful   
presence 
Nonjudgmental 
    acceptance 
EI Reappraisal Positive                
affect 
Negative 
affect 
Debiasing sunk-cost .504       
Mindful   presence .193** .754      
Nonjudgmental acceptance .090 .665** .818     
EI .118* .721** .739** .834    
Reappraisal .102* .657** .722** .803** .874   
Positive affect .128* .656** .732** .758** .674** .718  
Negative affect -.190** -.418** -.544** -.493** -.430** -.633** .775 
 
Note. N = 378. Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients of individual measures in boldface lie diagonally in the table.   
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).         
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
 
 Multiple regression analysis was performed to assess the predicted main effects of 
debiasing SCF by independent and control variables.  Table-3 below shows the details of 
regression coefficients, significant R square values, and a check for multicollinearity.  
Among the independent variables, only dispositional negative affect and mindful presence 
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had significant regression coefficients (dispositional negative affect: B = -.102, p < .05; 
dispositional mindful presence: B = .269, p < .005).  As regards control variables, only age 
had a significant regression coefficient (B = .157, p < .0005). The overall R square (.121) of 
the multiple regression for all predictor and control variables was significant [F (12, 346) = 
3.954, p < .0005].  Thus, age and mindful presence were found to predict debiasing SCF 
positively while dispositional negative affect was found to predict debiasing SCF inversely.  
There were lack of significant results for other independent and control variables despite 
strong inter-correlations among them.  It may be a consequence of multicollinearity between 
variables, for example, the trait-EI/reappraisal correlation was high (r = .803) and the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) value for trait-EI found in the multiple regression was higher 
than 4, advising that multicollinearity was present.  However, the EI/reappraisal pair of 
predictors did not pose difficulty for interpretation as they were not significant enough to 
result in combined prediction of the dependent variable.  Overall, the regression coefficients 
were weak, with dispositional mindful presence having the highest influence in predicting 
the variability of debiasing SCF. 
 
Table-3 Debiasing SCF regressed on the predictor and control variables 
  Unstandardised coefficient   Adjusted  
Predictor variable B t Significance R square R square VIF 
Negative affect -.102 -2.049 .041   2.128 
Positive affect .051 .568 .571   3.836 
Mindful presence .269 3.243 .001   2.513 
Nonjudgmental acceptance -.099 -1.274 .203   3.283 
EI .054 .455 .650   4.296 
Reappraisal  -.015 -.165 .869   3.205 
       
Control variable           
Age .157 3.596 .000   1.111 
Gender    -.019   -.191                     .849     1.063 
Self-esteem -.096 -1.928 .055   2.729 
Income bracket .004 .085 .933   1.225 
Education level .023 .473 .637   1.150 
Meditation experience -.041 -1.001 .317 .121 .090 1.099 
              
N ranges from 366 to 378.             
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Proposed Moderation 
H4 and H6 were formulated on the basis of moderation effect, which refers to the 
relationship between reappraisal (the independent variable) and resistance to SCF (the 
dependent variable) that depends on the value of the moderator (trait-mindfulness for H4, 
trait-EI for H6).  Figure-2 below shows the statistical model of mediation.  Both H4 and H6 
moderations belong to a model of a continuous dependent variable and continuous 
independent variable, modified by a continuous moderator.  The moderation effect was 
investigated by regression analysis.  As found in the correlation analysis, dispositional 
mindful presence and nonjudgmental acceptance positively correlated with reappraisal (r 
values were .657 and .722) while trait-EI positively correlated with reappraisal (.803).  In 
order to avoid multicollinearity due to high correlation of these predictors, all variables 
except the resistance to sunk-cost items were mean-centred, and the interaction terms 
(independent x moderator) were calculated before entering into regression.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-2 Statistical model of moderation 
Model 1: Interaction between independent variable and moderator 
  Model 2: Interaction among independent variable, moderator, and independent variable X moderator 
 
 
       Independent  
        Moderator          Dependent 
Independent x Moderator  
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Table-4 below exhibits the coefficients obtained for model 2 (with interaction) 
variables and the variation by comparing R square change from model 1 (without interaction) 
to model 2 for debiasing SCF regressed on reappraisal with trait-EI and trait-mindfulness as 
moderators.  
 
Trait-EI moderation: A two-step hierarchical multiple regression was run to examine the 
increase in variation explained by the addition of an interaction term between trait-EI as 
moderator and reappraisal as independent variable in debiasing SCF in a two-way interaction. 
Trait-EI did not moderate the effect of reappraisal on debiasing SCF, as it was not evident by 
a statistically significant increase in total variation (F (1, 374) = 1.793, p = .181).  As R square 
change advises the strength of the variation between the outcome and all of the predictors 
combined together, R square change of .5% meant there was no significant interaction.  Thus, 
H6 was not supported. 
 
Trait-mindfulness moderation:  A two-step hierarchical multiple regression was run to 
evaluate the increase in variation explained by the addition of interaction terms between 
dispositional mindful presence and nonjudgmental acceptance as joint moderators and 
reappraisal as the independent variable in debiasing SCF in a three-way interaction. The 
small change in R square of 1.6% was not significant (F (4, 370) = 1.530, p = .193).  Hence, 
H4 was not supported.  
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Table-4 Testing moderation for trait-EI and trait-mindfulness as moderators   
  Trait-EI  Trait-mindfulness 
    R square    R square 
Model 2 variable B t change  B t change 
Intercept 4.420 79.153*     4.432 77.116*   
Mean-centred EI  .131 1.361           
Mean-centred Reappraisal .023 .281     .003 .034   
Mean-centred Mindful Presence         .280 3.591*   
Mean-centred Nonjudgmental Acceptance         -.070 -1.060   
Mean-centred EI                
  x  Mean-centred Reappraisal .050 1.339 .005         
Mean-centred Mindful Presence                
  x  Mean-centred Reappraisal         .131 1.998   
Mean-centred Mindful Presence                
  x Mean-centred Nonjudgmental Acceptance         -.038 -.661   
Mean-centred Nonjudgmental Acceptance                
  x Mean-centred Reappraisal         -.037 -.675   
Mean-centred Mindful Presence                
  x Mean-centred Nonjudgmental Acceptance                
  x Mean-centred Reappraisal         -.004 -.162 .016 
                
Note: N = 378.                 
* t values are significant (p < .0005).               
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Despite the face validity of the tripartite emotion-functioning capacities, debiasing 
SCF using reappraisal as the predictor and trait-EI and trait-mindfulness as separate 
moderators were not supported.  This finding may be a false negative since moderation effect 
is more difficult to detect in a non-experimental research than in an experimental setting and 
interactive effects require greater statistical power to detect.  McClelland and Judd (1993) 
postulate factors that account for the differential statistical power of experiments over field 
studies for detecting interactions. Among them are less error found in experimental set-up 
than survey study, and theoretical and other constraints on the nature of interaction in non-
experimental research may restrict the magnitude of the moderated regression coefficient.  In 
the proposed trait-EI moderation, the moderated regression is expressed as: 
Debiasing SCF = B0 + B1Reappraisal + B2Trait-EI + B3Reappraisal x Trait-EI+ e 
 All regression coefficients are reported in Table-4 under their respective rows.  
Assuming all things equal, the greater the value of the partial regression coefficient B3, the 
greater the moderating effect of trait-EI on the relationship between reappraisal and debiasing 
SCF. B3 was only .05, suggesting an extremely weak moderating effect did it ever exist. 
 The survey was a trait-level setting.  The participants may not have perceived any 
emotion episodes when they answered the sunk-cost questions.  That already stopped the 
functioning of the chain of EI processes, namely, the second branch of using emotion-related 
information to facilitate decision-making, the third as understanding emotion or emotion 
knowledge, and the fourth branch- managing ER.   
 The regression coefficients in the proposed trait-mindfulness/reappraisal moderation 
were small and inversely related to one another (see Table-4), rendering moderation 
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nonsignificant.  Similar to the trait-EI/reappraisal moderation, the reason why trait-
mindfulness/reappraisal moderation was not supported appears to be attributed to inoperative 
reappraisal due to no stimulus.  
Nonsignificant results for the moderation hypotheses may be attributed to Type II 
error.  To this, a post-hoc evaluation of the power achieved in the study was performed 
[Appendix-7(i)].  The author referred to the lowest significant correlation in Table-2 and 
adopted the sunk-cost/reappraisal correlation (r = .102, p = .047) to calculate power (1 - β) 
using G*Power.  The power was found to be low (.622), suggesting that some of the 
multivariate relationships were highly exposed to Type II error as the probability of making 
the error could be as high as 37.8%.  Retrospective power offers no additional information 
for explaining the non-significance of findings (Howell, 2007).  The only solution is to 
increase the sample size.  
The varying degrees of correlations among the predictors and dependent variable may 
cause confusion on what theory should take precedence in explaining the phenomena 
embedded in the data, especially when multicollinearity existed between some variables, for 
example, the EI/reappraisal correlation.  To answer the question on relative importance of 
predictors in the sample under study, Budescu’s (1993) dominance analysis was applied to 
positive and negative affectivity, and the tripartite emotion-functioning capacities (see Table-
5).  In the analysis, all predictors were placed in descending order of their (significant) 
correlations with debiasing SCF.  Mindful presence was found to attain complete dominance 
over all other individual variables.   It explained the largest unique variance and the other 
variables contributed little variance over and above the effect of mindful presence.  In terms 
of their respective compositions in the total R square, mindful presence contributed the most 
(42%), followed by negative affect (39%), positive affect (8%), EI (6%), and reappraisal 
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(5%).  Positive affect, EI and reappraisal were found to be less important in debiasing SCF 
as the analysis de-emphasised redundant predictors. 
  
Table-5 Dominance Analysis for affectivity and tripartite emotion-functioning capacities 
                Total   Additional contribution of  
  Submodel          R Square  X1 X2 X3 X4 X5   
  Null and k = 0 average         .037 .036 .016 .014 .010   
                                
    X1           .037     .014 .000 .001 .001   
    X2           .036   .016   .000 .001 .001   
    X3           .016   .021 .020   .001 .000   
    X4           .014   .024 .023 .003   .000   
    X5           .010   .028 .026 .006 .004     
  k = 1 average             .022 .021 .003 .002 .001   
                                
    X1 X2         .052       .005 .005 .004   
    X1 X3         .037     .020   .001 .001   
    X1 X4         .038     .019 .000   .000   
    X1 X5         .038     .017 .000 .000     
    X2 X3         .036   .021     .001 .000   
    X2 X4         .037   .020   .000   .000   
    X2 X5         .037   .019   .000 .000     
    X3 X4         .017   .021 .020     .000   
    X3 X5         .017   .022 .020   .001     
    X4 X5         .014   .024 .023 .003       
  k = 2 average             .021 .020 .002 .001 .001   
                                
    X1 X2 X3       .057         .002 .001   
    X1 X2 X4       .057       .002   .001   
    X1 X2 X5       .056       .003 .002     
    X1 X3 X4       .039     .020     .000   
    X1 X3 X5       .039     .020   .000     
    X1 X4 X5       .038     .019 .001       
    X2 X3 X4       .037   .022       .000   
    X2 X3 X5       .037   .022     .000     
    X2 X4 X5       .037   .020   .000       
    X3 X4 X5       .017   .022 .020         
  k = 3 average             .021 .019 .001 .001 .001   
                                
    X1 X2 X3 X4     .059           .000   
    X1 X2 X3 X5     .058         .001     
    X1 X2 X4 X5     .057       .002       
    X1 X3 X4 X5     .039     .020         
    X2 X3 X4 X5     .037   .022           
  k = 4 average             .022 .020 .002 .001 .000   
                                
    X1 X2 X3 X4 X5   .059               
                                
  Overall average           .025 .023 .005 .004 .003   
                                
  Note:  X1= Mindful presence, X2= Negative affect, X3= Positive affect, X4= EI, X5= Reappraisal   
    Independent variable= debiasing sunk-cost               
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Dominance analysis gave clarity on the operational importance among both positive 
and negative affectivity and the tripartite emotion-functioning capacities.  The result that 
there was no significant regression coefficient for positive affect, EI and reappraisal in 
predicting debiasing SCF reflects the potential redundancy of these attributes in predicting 
resistance to SCF.   
Before the foregoing analyses were used to illuminate findings, two additional 
analyses were conducted to ascertain: i) the inter-relationships of the individual items of 
debiasing SCF measure, ii) relationships among debiasing SCF and the control variables.   
 
Supplementary analysis I 
In contrast to multicollinearity seen in some bivariates which had high Cronbach’s 
coefficients, a moderate Cronbach’s coefficient found in the resistance to sunk-cost measure 
(.504) had a different implication.  Owing to this modest reliability, the following exploratory 
analysis was carried out to assess individual measures of debiasing SCF.   
Table-6 Pearson's correlations for the seven debiasing SCF items   
Predictor/control 
variable 
Q3:      
Eating a 
dessert  
Q4:   
Writing 
a toast 
Q5:     
Buying 
a ring 
Q6:  
Wearing 
the stars? 
Q7:      
Cello or 
guitar? 
Q8:     
Movie or 
coffee? 
Q9:     
Resort or 
home? 
Mindful presence       .157** .101* .152** .114* 
Nonjudgmental 
acceptance 
.150**             
EI .120*             
Reappraisal .101*             
Positive affect .114*             
Negative affect -.153**   -.115* -.103*  -.135** 
Age -.127*       .118*  .192**  .285**  
 
Note: N = 378.  Only significant correlations are shown. 
  
** and * denote correlations at 1% and 5% significant levels respectively. 
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To understand more about inter-relationships among the seven items of the resistance 
to sunk-cost measure, Pearson's correlations of the seven items with age and the six predictor 
variables and were obtained (Table-6 above). Mindful presence was found to correlate 
positively to Questions 6, 7, 8 and 9 while negative affect correlated negatively to Questions 
3, 6, 7 and 9.  Age correlated to Questions 3, 7, 8 and 9.  Negative affect and age may be 
inversely dependent on each other.  Question 3 had bivariate correlations with all predictor 
variables except mindful presence.   
Multiple regression was performed for each of the seven questions as dependent 
variable with the predictor and control variables (see Table-7 below).  Mindful presence, 
negative affect and age were the variables that had significant regression coefficients across 
three questions, which were marginally higher in absolute value than those found in Table-3.  
Contrasting results found in gender and self-esteem suggest that the type of decision being 
made depends on how the participants perceived about the scenario-based questions.  Other 
variables with significant coefficients found in less than three questions seemed not to be 
strong enough to have significant coefficients in the complete debiasing SCF regression (c.f. 
Table-3).  No significant regression coefficient was found in Question 7.   
Overall, these findings from correlations and regression suggest that the antecedents 
of SCF may be context-dependent, that is, depending on the type of decision being made.  
For example, the multi-correlated Question 3 ended up a single regression for debiasing SCF.  
It asked participants whether to continue prior commitment at their disutility.  Possibly, those 
who chose to finish may not want to appear wasteful according to Arkes and Blumer (1985), 
whereas older people may have a different perspective.   
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Table-7 Regression coefficients (B) for the resistance to sunk-cost items 
Predictor/control variable 
        
Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 
                
Mindful presence       .441**   .456**   .601* 
Negative affect   -.272**     -.207**      -.222** 
Positive affect      .381**         
EI              -.508** 
Nonjudgmental acceptance -.353**   -.486*         
Age  .229**          .307*  .432* 
Gender    -.582*  .613*         
Self-esteem      .213** -.281*        
Length of meditation practice     -.210**        
                
Note: N ranges from 366 to 378.  Only significant coefficients are shown. 
** and * denote t values at  p < .05 and p < .005 respectively. 
     
             
 
 
 
             
Supplementary analysis II  
Varying degrees of debiasing SCF situations were evaluated according to sample’s 
demographics.  To this, mean scores of different classes of ordinal data from the control 
variables were compared and the mean differences were tested whether significant results 
could be found (Howell, 2007).  Table-8 below shows the control variables’ correlations with 
debiasing sunk-cost measure and basis of their mean comparisons. 
Table-8 Control variables- correlations with debiasing SCF and basis of mean comparisons 
Control variable N 
Correlation 
with 
debiasing 
sunk-cost Mean score / group Data characteristic   
Gender 
378   Dichotomous: 1 = female, 2 = male 
  
Age 
378 .212* 46 4 classes of ordinal data   
Self-esteem 
378 .061 4.76 Continuous on a 7-point Likert scale 
  
Income bracket 
366 .051 $41,200 4 classes of ordinal data   
Education level 
370 .018 Undergraduate study 5 classes of ordinal data 
  
Length of mindfulness 
meditation practice 378 -.034 Less than three months 5 classes of ordinal data   
* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).     
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First, to answer whether gender may have an effect on susceptibility to sunk-cost 
Levene’s test for homoscedasticity was used.  Here the two genders were treated as two 
independent samples, both subjected to t-test for equality of means (Howell, 2007).  Data 
were presented as mean ± standard deviation.  Debiasing SCF score decreased from female 
(4.46 ± .92) to male (4.40 ± 1.08).  The equal variances assumption was upheld (p = .296).  
There was no statistically significant difference between female and male in debiasing SCF 
(t = .063, p = .950).  It seems that gender has no bearing on debiasing SCF.   
Table-9 One-way ANOVA for differences among age groups and three related measures  
             
Age 
group Age groups 
Mean difference Debiasing 
Sunk-cost 
Negative 
Affect Self-esteem 
 
N  
50+ 21-29 years 78 .476* -.782* .635*  
  30-39 years 85 .442* -.405 .158  
  40-49 years 59 .252 -.535 .434  
  50 and older 156        
  Total 378        
50+ 21-29 years Tukey HSD Std. 
Error 
.131 .195 .229  
  30-39 years .127 .189 .223  
  40-49 years .144 .215 .253  
50+ 21-29 years Tukey HSD Sig. .002 .000 .030 
 
  30-39 years .003 .143 .893 
 
  40-49 years .302 .063 .316 
 
50+ 21-29 years 95% CI .139 -1.285 .043  
  30-39 years Lower Bound .114 -.894 -.417  
  40-49 years -.120 -1.089 -.218  
50+ 21-29 years 95% CI .814 -.279 1.227  
  30-39 years Upper Bound .770 .084 .734  
  40-49 years .624 .020 1.087  
ANOVA 
F (3, 374) 6.294 6.052 2.914 
 
Sig. .000 .000 .034 
 
*The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.      
 
Second, as sunk-cost only correlated age (r = .212, p < .01) but not the other control 
variables, it was useful to investigate the relationship between debiasing SCF and different 
age groups.  A one-way ANOVA (Howell, 2007) was performed to ascertain whether the 
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ability to debias SCF was different for different age groups. Debiasing SCF score decreased 
from the 21-29 bracket (4.22 ± .96), to 30-39 (4.25 ± 1.08), then increased to 40-49 (4.44 
± .91) to 50+ (4.69 ± .87).  As shown in Table-9 above, the differences between these age 
groups was statistically significant (F (3, 374) = 6.294, p < .0005).  Tukey post-hoc analysis 
revealed that the increase from 21-29 to 50+ [.476, 95%CI (.139 to .814)] was statistically 
significant (p < .005), as well as the increase from 30-39 to 50+ [.442, 95%CI (.114 to .770); 
p < .005]. No other group differences were statistically significant.   
Age was found to correlate inversely with negative affect (r = -.199, p < .01) and 
positively with self-esteem (r = .124, p < .05).  With a relatively high Pearson’s correlation 
in absolute value (r = -.649, p < .01), negative affect correlated inversely but strongly with 
self-esteem.  By controlling age, one-way ANOVA and Tukey post-hoc analysis were 
conducted for these related measures.  For sake of brevity, means and deviations for the items 
under test were disregarded when reporting results.  The comparison reviewed that the 50+ 
attained lower negative affect [-.782, 95%CI (-1.285 to -.279), p < .0005] and higher self-
esteem [.635, 95%CI (.043 to 1.227), p < .05] than the 21-29 age group.  No other age group 
differences were statistically significant.  In line with the literature reviewed, older people 
especially those at fifty or more were found to be less susceptible to SCF than younger people 
(21 to 39).  The 50+ group was also found to attain lower negative affect and higher self-
esteem than the 21-29 age group.   However, there was no correlation between self-esteem 
and debiasing SCF, nor did self-esteem correlate to trait-EI (as argued by some researchers, 
see Chapter Two). The finding that older people with low negative affectivity had association 
with debiasing SCF is echoed by findings of Suri and Gross (2012) that older people attain 
successful ER and that one factor may be reduced responsiveness to regret, a core element 
leading to SCF.  Supported by the negative affect/self-esteem correlation, people high in 
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negative affectivity are prone to show low self-esteem (Watson and Clark, 1984).  The effect 
of self-esteem appears to be consequential rather than causal. Possibly, older people have got 
affluent experience in managing their emotions particularly downregulating negative affect, 
suggesting that their self-esteem is actualised as a result of lowered negative affectivity and 
susceptibility to SCF is attenuated.    
Third, one-way ANOVA and Tukey post-hoc analysis were used again to test whether 
debiasing SCF was influenced by cognitive and socio-economic ability represented by 
different income bracket and education level.  There were 73 in the $0 to $14,999 income 
bracket, 94 in $15,000 to $29,999 group, 121 in $30,000 to $59,999 group, and 78 in the 
$60,000+ income group.  As regards education, there were 5 in the secondary school level, 
173 in the high school or technical/vocational training level, 70 in undergraduate study, 88 
graduated from universities, and 34 were at postgraduate level.  No statistically significant 
differences were found among different income or education groups, suggesting that 
cognitive and socio-economic abilities may not play any roles in debiasing SCF.  
The last but not the least control variable, Mindfulness meditation practice, was found 
to provide a versatile role in the study.  Mindfulness previously experienced by participants, 
expressed in terms of the time taken to practise meditation, was differentiated among 
practitioners by five groups.  Table-10 below shows the various periods of time meditation 
was practised by participants, and the number of participants in each group.  Also shown in 
the Table are one-way ANOVA and Tukey post-hoc analysis which compared the different 
mindfulness practising groups against resistance to sunk-cost, the six emotion-functioning 
measures, and self-esteem.  Meditation practice was found to have no correlation with 
debiasing SCF.  However, those who practised for three years or more was found to be 
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significantly different from those who practised for three months but less than a year [.741, 
95%CI (.043 to 1.439), p < .05].   
Meditation practice was also found to be uncorrelated to negative affect but the group 
who practised for three years or more was found to have significantly lower negative effect 
than those who practised for less than three months [-1.331, 95%CI (-2.290 to -.373); 
p < .005], and lower than those who practised for three months but less than a year [-1.036, 
95%CI (-2.070 to -.002); p < .05], and again lower than those who practised for a year but 
less than three years [-1.269, 95%CI (-2.374 to -.165); p < .05].     
The following control variables were found to positively correlate with meditation 
practice: positive affect (r = .139); mindful presence (r = .209); nonjudgmental acceptance (r 
= .150); EI (r = .188); reappraisal (r = .191); self-esteem (r = .167).  These correlations were 
significant at the .01 level.  The group who practised for three years or more was compared 
to those who never or had practised but soon discontinued.  The former was found to have 
statistically significant results than the latter in the following: higher positive effect [.794, 
95%CI (.181 to 1.408); p < .005]; higher mindful presence [.713, 95%CI (.181 to 1.245); 
p < .005]; higher nonjudgmental acceptance [.709, 95%CI (.056 to 1.362); p < .05]; higher 
EI [.676, 95%CI (.195 to 1.158); p < .005]; higher reappraisal [.851, 95%CI (.296 to 1.406); 
p < .0005]; and higher self-esteem [1.190, 95%CI (.264 to 2.116); p < .005]. 
When compared with the non-practitioners, those who practised for three years or 
more were found to have higher dispositional positive effect, higher dispositional mindful 
presence, higher dispositional nonjudgmental acceptance, higher trait-EI, higher reappraisal, 
and higher self-esteem.  In tandem with Kiken et al.’s (2015) finding that constant practice 
of meditation increases trait mindfulness, long-term practitioners appeared to distinguish 
themselves from non-practitioners in the attributes discussed.  Also, long-standing 
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practitioners differentiated themselves in managing negative affect from those who practised 
for relatively shorter periods, although the former group was not significantly different from 
non-practitioners.  This may be due to anti-selection as people typically treat mindfulness 
meditation as a kind of cognitive behavioural therapy or stress reduction programme (e.g. 
Kabat-Zinn, 2003) and only practise meditation when they feel the need or are advised to do 
so.  On the other hand, mindfulness is a naturally-occurring phenomenon that can present in 
non-practitioners of mindfulness meditation (Brown and Ryan, 2003; Kabat-Zinn, 2003).  
The finding of progressive downregulation of dispositional negative affectivity shown by 
meditation practitioners seems to concur with their ability in upregulating dispositional 
positive affectivity, trait-mindfulness, trait-EI and reappraisal. 
The foregoing analyses and interpretations are translated into findings in Chapter 
Five.
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Table-10 One-way ANOVA for differences among meditation practitioners and eight related measures 
Period 
practised Different period practised 
Mean 
difference Debiasing 
Sunk-cost 
Positive 
Affect 
Negative 
Affect 
Mindful  
Presence 
Nonjudgmental 
Acceptance EI Reappraisal 
Self 
esteem N 
Three years 
or more 
Never or had practiced but soon 
discontinued 
256 .283 .794* -0.763 .713* .709* .676* .851* 1.190* 
  Less than three months 43 .552 .688 -1.331* .406 .566 .424 .496 1.451* 
  Three months but less than a year 30 .741* .663 -1.036* .449 .316 .475 .778* .813 
  A year but less than three years 23 .646 .829 -1.269* .333 .607 .511 .638 .846 
  Three years or more 26                 
Three years 
or more 
Never or had practiced but soon 
discontinued 
Tukey 
HSD Std. 
Error 
.196 .224 .290 .194 .238 .176 .203 .338 
  Less than three months .236 .270 .350 .234 .288 .212 .244 .408 
  Three months but less than a year .255 .291 .377 .252 .310 .229 .264 .440 
  A year but less than three years .272 .311 .403 .270 .331 .244 .282 .470 
Three years 
or more 
Never or had practiced but soon 
discontinued 
Tukey 
HSD Sig. .599 .004 .067 .003 .026 .001 .000 .004 
  Less than three months .136 .083 .002 .414 .283 .268 .254 .004 
  Three months but less than a year .031 .155 .049 .388 .847 .233 .028 .347 
  A year but less than three years .124 .061 .015 .732 .357 .226 .159 .374 
Three years 
or more 
Never or had practiced but soon 
discontinued 
95% CI 
-.254 .181 -1.557 .181 .056 .195 .296 .264 
  Less than three months   -.095 -.053 -2.290 -.236 -.222 -.157 -.174 .333 
  Three months but less than a year Lower 
Bound 
.043 -.135 -2.070 -.243 -.534 -.152 .055 -.392 
  A year but less than three years -.100 -.024 -2.374 -.407 -.302 -.159 -.134 -.441 
Three years 
or more 
Never or had practiced but soon 
discontinued 
95% CI 
.819 1.408 .032 1.245 1.362 1.158 1.406 2.116 
  Less than three months   1.199 1.428 -.373 1.048 1.355 1.006 1.166 2.568 
  Three months but less than a year Upper 
Bound 
1.439 1.462 -.002 1.141 1.166 1.102 1.500 2.018 
  A year but less than three years 1.392 1.683 -.165 1.072 1.515 1.181 1.410 2.134 
ANOVA 
F (4, 373) 3.516 3.239 4.488 4.644 2.772 4.318 5.219 3.966 
Sig. .008 .012 .001 .001 .027 .002 .000 .004 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.                 
 
 
56 
 
Chapter Five 
 
Discussions of Findings 
The study used data collected from 378 US participants and conducted numerous 
statistical analyses to test the six hypotheses stipulated in Chapter Two.  Although all 
correlational hypotheses were supported, debiasing SCF by increasing dispositional mindful 
presence and lowering negative affectivity are considered robust findings because they show 
significant regression parameters when controlling for all other variables, and dominate the 
other independent variables in the dominance analysis.  However, multicollinearity between 
independent variables cannot be precluded as an explanation of  the correlations between the 
other variables and debiasing SCF.  For example, reappraisal shared many of the attributes 
of the EI measure.  This argument is further substantiated when the two moderation 
hypotheses were not supported.  The unsupported moderation effects on the reappraisal-
debiasing SCF relationship by either trait-EI or trait-mindfulness may be attributed to the 
fundamental operationalization of reappraisal.  There was perhaps barely any reappraisal at 
all since the hypothetical scenarios for sunk-cost may have been insufficient to trigger 
significant emotion during the course of administering the survey.  The disconfirmed 
moderation model seems to suggest that debiasing SCF may have worked in a different way 
other than the hypotheses implied.  Thus, findings for debiasing SCF by positive affect, trait-
EI or reappraisal are considered partially robust. 
 Demographic analysis of the control variables provided a more plausible explanation 
of the roles played by dispositional affectivity and the tripartite emotion-functioning 
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capacities in connection with debiasing SCF at trait-level.  Trait-mindfulness, the most 
prominent element contributing to debiasing SCF, has been found to be the key aligning the 
other elements in debiasing SCF.  The findings on the enhancement of upregulating 
dispositional positive affect, trait-EI, reappraisal and downregulating dispositional negative 
affect exhibited by long-standing mindfulness meditation practitioners become the core 
findings. Tantamount to these findings, Chiesa, Calati, and Serretti (2011) claim that long-
term meditation practitioners have higher abilities to identify alternative perspectives, display 
higher positive affect and lower negative affect than non-practitioners.  It appears that 
mindful decision-makers attenuate their susceptibility to SCF by not fixating on the sunk 
costs incurred in the past, and refraining from experiencing anticipated future regret.  
Additionally, mindfulness is not just present-centred nonjudgmental awareness but should 
also be considered as having a retentive ability connected to working-memory as mindfulness 
retains a focus on the object of attention (Chiesa et al., 2011; Dreyfus, 2011).  This mnemonic 
aspect of mindfulness seems to cause the development of clear comprehension after a 
prolonged practice of mindfulness meditation.  The ultimate goal of this dispositional 
mindfulness is to attain an insightful understanding of the changing nature of an individual’s 
bodily and mental states in order to free the mind from a general tendency that brings about 
human suffering (Dreyfus, 2011).  The regret-driven SCF is one kind of such suffering and 
seems likely to be attenuated by trait-mindfulness. 
Mindfulness meditation practice appears to accumulate the qualities of state-
mindfulness and such retained qualities, in particular lowered negative affect, are exhibited 
in generic forms in people’s daily life.  Specifically, Farb, Anderson, Mayberg, Bean, 
Mckeon, and Segal (2010) stressed the importance of mindfulness training in reducing 
vulnerability to dysphoric reactivity by modifying the neural expression of sadness, the 
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attribute that leads to more risk-acceptant behaviour such as exhibiting SCF.  The foregoing 
arguments suggest that debiasing SCF by lowered dispositional negative affect may be 
consequential to the influence of trait-mindfulness.  On the other hand, since negative affect 
can manifest itself even without an overt cause, debiasing SCF by virtue of participants’ 
dispositions of negative affect cannot be ruled out.  Further, the finding that the 50+ 
participants exhibited lower negative affect than the younger counterparts suggests that the 
phenomenon may be attributed to successful aging (Suri and Gross, 2012) which led to less 
susceptibility to SCF.  The counter-argument that lowered dispositional negative affect 
relieves susceptibility to SCF by either or both of these reasons is viable, albeit less robust 
than the argument for debiasing SCF by the effect of trait-mindfulness.  
The study’s theoretical and empirical underpinnings support the claims that at trait-
level when emotion trajectory is not activated: first, trait-mindfulness instead of reappraisal 
appears to be responsible for maintaining a hedonic mood of higher dispositional positive 
affect and lower dispositional negative affect for decision-makers; second, trait-mindfulness 
seems to provide the locus for rectifying decision biases such as the SCF because of its 
characteristics, particularly the clarity embedded in the retentive capacity as accumulated by 
constant practice of mindfulness meditation.  Overall, these arguments resonate with 
Peterson’s (2014) claim that some professional traders who use daily meditative practice to 
cultivate mindfulness excel in their business. 
 
Limitations and future research  
Also important to the study are the practicalities of research and their implications for 
cognitive psychology.  The measurement of dispositional negative affect was confined to 
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nervousness, shame and distress for the sake of simplifying the administration of the survey.  
However, these affective states may not cover all relevant negative affectivity that SCF 
relates.  Furthermore, the measurement of negative affectivity is complex as it depends on 
“how people feel about themselves and their world rather than how effectively they may 
actually handle themselves in the world” (Watson and Clark, 1984: p.466).   This 
characteristic of people’s subjective experience suggests that participants may ascribe 
different meanings to the same question, which also helps explain that concepts of the SCF 
was context-dependent to the participants being studied.  Therefore, there may be alternative 
approach that dispositional negative affectivity can be better studied for financial decision-
making, for example a controlled experiment.  This approach may be able to differentiate 
whether debiasing SCF by negative affectivity is accomplished by facilitation of mindfulness 
or on its own merits.  Separately, there are at least three schools of thoughts popularising as 
EI.  Besides Mayer et al.’s (2004) ability-based model that the study adopted, there are 
Goleman’s (1998) competence model and personality traits model of Petrides and Furnham 
(2003).  They may have different perspectives on the same thing.  Therefore, even if trait-EI 
was found to significantly associate with debiasing SCF, decision-makers might not be able 
to know which EI attributes they should develop in order to debias SCF.  On the other hand, 
state mindfulness can be acquired in a relatively short period of time.  Even an eight-minute 
focused breathing meditation can decrease mind wandering in an attention-focused response 
task (Mrazek, Smallwood, and Schooler, 2012).  Mindfulness meditation can be a more 
effective technique of debiasing cognitive biases than teaching people how to tackle these 
biases.   
 In addition to the limitations as discussed in the foregoing section, the following 
issues are addressed in conjunction with recommendations for future research. First, a cross-
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sectional study such as the current research cannot provide cause-and-effect underpinning of 
the interactions among the key variables under study.  Only a longitudinal study or a 
controlled experiment can establish causal inferences among variables.  Therefore, a 
prospective controlled experiment for state-level measurement may complement the current 
study.  To this end, state mindfulness is induced at the commencement of the experiment and 
results are compared with a control group.  Second, mindfulness’ retentive nature and 
working-memory capacity may share a common locus where emotion can be regulated.  A 
controlled experiment is more desirable to study their performance and interactions.  Third, 
the low internal consistency of the debiasing SCF measure suggests that participants’ 
reactions to the measure was context-dependent, partly due to the construct of the sunk-cost 
questionnaire and partly due to the common-method approach.  This echoes the need to use 
separate methods to measure debiasing SCF (performance data) and predictor variables 
(attitudinal data) if the concept of the study were to replicate.  Fourth, as discussed emotion 
trajectory was perhaps not activated in the current study, rendering trait-
mindfulness/reappraisal and trait-EI/reappraisal moderation not supported.  Yet, the study 
suggests that these variables are situated in a continuum.  A larger sample may offer evidence 
to support the proposed moderation.  Thus, a future research engaging a larger sample would 
be complementary to the current study if the same measurement is used for a state-level study.   
Fifth, a post-hoc test on power achieved in the study found that the study was susceptible to 
Type II error.  A larger sample is required to improve results.  Appendix-7(ii) shows a priori 
calculation of required sample for future research based on the sunk-cost/reappraisal 
correlation.  A sample of 1,035 will be needed.  The increased sample requirement should be 
applied with caution largely because a questionnaire-based study is not likely to be adequate 
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to trigger strong emotions which require reappraisal.  Even if it is, the large sample will not 
be cost effective for a trait-level study as such. 
 In sum, the study considers that the prominent role of mindfulness in rectifying 
cognitive biases such as SCF is the key contribution of the study.  The sunk-cost bias can cost 
substantially to a decision-maker while just a brief meditative exercise may improve the 
quality of financial decision-making.  In addition, mindfulness has been found to bring about 
desirable qualities to people’s life, such as their psychological well-being and stress-reductive 
effect, which unlock people’s potential to meet the relentless demands of life.   
 The overall findings are not an end per se but should be regarded as more reliable 
means to substantiate concepts on the tripartite emotion-functioning capacities, which in turn 
encourage future research interest in the domain of cognitive psychology and behavioural 
economics. 
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Appendix-3 (i) The Questionnaire with scale classification
Item 
No. Question Scale
1 What is your gender? CV
2 How old are you? CV
3
After a large meal at a restaurant, you order a big dessert with chocolate and ice cream.  After a few 
bites you find you are full and you would rather not eat any more of it.  Would you be more likely to eat 
more or to stop eating it?
        
SC
4
You have been asked to give a toast at your friend’s wedding.  You have worked for hours on this one 
story about you and your friend taking drivers education, but you still have some work to do on it.  Then 
you realize that you could finish writing the speech faster if you start over and tell the funnier story about 
the dance lessons you took together. Would you be more likely to finish the toast about driving or rewrite 
it to be about dancing?
        
SC
5
You are buying a gold ring on layaway for someone special.  It costs $240 and you have already paid 
$120 on it, so you owe another $120.  One day, you see in the paper that a new jewelry store is selling the 
same ring for only $110 as a special sale, and you can pay for it using layaway.  The new store is across 
the street from the old one.  If you decide to get the ring from the new store, you will not be able to get 
your money back from the old store, but you would save $10 overall. Would you be more likely to 
continue paying at the old store or buy from the new store?
        
SC
6
You have been looking forward to this year’s Halloween party.  You have the right cape, the right wig, 
and the right hat. All week, you have been trying to perfect the outfit by cutting out a large number of tiny 
stars to glue to the cape and the hat, and you still need to glue them on. On the day of Halloween, you 
decide that the outfit looks better without all these stars you have worked so hard on.  Would you be 
more likely to wear the stars or go without?
        
SC
7
You decide to learn to play a musical instrument.  After you buy an expensive cello, you find you are no 
longer interested. Your neighbor is moving and you are excited that she is leaving you her old guitar, for 
free.  You’d like to learn how to play it.  Would you be more likely to practice the cello or the guitar?
SC
8
You and your friend are at a movie theatre together.  Both you and your friend are getting bored with the 
storyline.  You’d hate to waste the money spent on the ticket, but you both feel that you would have a 
better time at the coffee shop next door.  You could sneak out without other people noticing. Would you 
be more likely to stay or to leave?
        
SC
9
You and your friend have driven halfway to a resort.  Both you and your friend feel sick. You both feel 
that you both would have a much better weekend at home.  Your friend says it is "too bad" you already 
drove halfway, because you both would much rather spend the time at home.  You agree.  Would you be 
more likely to drive on or turn back?
          
  SC
10 You are open to the experience of the present moment. MP
11 When you experience a positive emotion, you know how to make it last.
       
EI
12 You are able to appreciate yourself. NJA
13 You are friendly to yourself when things go wrong. NJA
14 Generally, you are determined in the situations you are in. PA
Abbreviation: R = reappraisal, EI = emotional intelligence, NJA = nonjudgmental acceptance, MP = mindful presence,
    PA = positive affect,  NA = negative affect, SC = debiasing sunk-cost, CV = control variable, QC = quality check
To be continued on next page …
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Appendix-3 (i) The Questionnaire with scale classification
Continued from previous pageItem 
No. Question Scale
15 You experience moments of inner peace and ease, even when things get hectic and stressful. NJA
16 When you want to feel more positive emotion, you change the way you’re thinking about the situation. R
17 Generally, you feel enthusiastic about things around you. PA
18 Some of the major events of your life have led you to re-evaluate what is important and not important. EI
19 You control your emotions by changing the way you think about the situation you’re in. R
20 When you notice an absence of mind, you gently return to the experience of the here and now. MP
21 In difficult situations, you can pause without immediately reacting. NJA
22 When you are in a positive mood, solving problems is easy for you.
       
EI
23 Generally, you are ashamed of yourself. NA
24 You motivate yourself by imagining a good outcome to tasks you take on. EI
25 You feel connected to your experience in the here-and-now. MP
26 When you want to feel less negative emotion, you change the way you’re thinking about the situation. R
27 You expect good things to happen. EI
28 Generally, you feel nervous about things around you. NA
29 You have control over your emotions. EI
30 When you feel a change in emotions, you tend to come up with new ideas. EI
31
When you want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), you change what you’re 
thinking about.
R
32 You pay attention to what’s behind your actions. MP
33 Generally, you feel that you are proud of yourself. PA
34
When you’re faced with a stressful situation, you make yourself think about it in a way that helps you 
stay calm.
R
35
When you want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), you change what you’re 
thinking about.
R
36 Generally, you feel distressed about things around you. NA
37 When you are in a positive mood, you are able to come up with new ideas. EI
38 You have high self-esteem. CV
39 Who is the current U.S. president? QC
40 What was your personal income last year? CV
41 What is the highest level of education you have completed? CV
42 How long have you ever practiced mindfulness meditation regularly? CV
Abbreviation: R = reappraisal, EI = emotional intelligence, NJA = nonjudgmental acceptance, MP = mindful presence,
    PA = positive affect,  NA = negative affect, SC = debiasing sunk-cost, CV = control variable, QC = quality check
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Appendix-3 (ii) The Questionnaire in the full survey including rubric 
A study of emotions and behavior 
 
Start of Block: Default Question Block 
 
This survey is part of a research study on emotions and behavior. There are no right or wrong answers to the 
questions.  Please give the response that best describes your feelings or reactions.   
 
We expect the survey to take around 10 minutes to complete. The survey will ask you to reflect on your own emotions and 
thinking and on the ways you behave in a number of everyday life situations. You can withdraw from the survey at any 
point and the data will be discarded automatically in the system seven days after you have partially completed the 
survey.  You may continue the survey within the first seven days after you started it.  Once you have completed the survey 
please click the next button if you are happy to submit, otherwise just leave the browser for withdrawal from the survey 
(no response is recorded in this situation).   
 
By proceeding with the survey you acknowledge that: 
1 the purpose and possible effects of participating in this research have been explained to your satisfaction.  
2 you understand that that you are free to withdraw from the survey without explanation or prejudice until the survey has 
been completed and submitted.    
3 you understand that the confidentiality of the information you provide will be safeguarded subject to any legal 
requirements  
4 you understand that with your consent the data generated will be stored by the Open University UK in anonymised form 
and will be destroyed after a maximum of ten years.  
5 you understand that that anonymized research data may be made available to other members of the research community 
subject to the rules of the Open University UK for a period of ten years.  
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Thank you for your Help with this study.  Please click the next button to get started! 
Q1 What is your gender?  
o Female  (1)  
o Male  (2)  
 
Q2 How old are you? 
o Under 21  (1)  
o 21-29 years  (2)  
o 30-39 years  (3)  
o 40-49 years  (4)  
o 50 and older  (5)  
 
Q3  After a large meal at a restaurant, you order a big dessert with chocolate and ice cream.  After a few bites you find 
you are full and you would rather not eat any more of it.  
  Would you be more likely to eat more or to stop eating it?     
o Most likely to eat more  (1)  
o More likely to eat more  (2)  
o Likely to eat more  (3)  
o Neutral  (4)  
o Likely to stop eating  (5)  
o More likely to stop eating  (6)  
o Most likely to stop eating  (7)  
 
Q4 You have been asked to give a toast at your friend’s wedding.  You have worked for hours on this one story about 
you and your friend taking drivers education, but you still have some work to do on it.  Then you realize that you could 
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finish writing the speech faster if you start over and tell the funnier story about the dance lessons you took 
together.     Would you be more likely to finish the toast about driving or rewrite it to be about dancing?  
o Most likely to write about driving  (1)  
o More likely to write about driving  (2)  
o Likely to write about driving  (3)  
o Neutral  (4)  
o Likely to  write about dancing  (5)  
o More likely to  write about dancing  (6)  
o Most likely to  write about dancing  (7)  
 
Q5 You are buying a gold ring on layaway for someone special.  It costs $240 and you have already paid $120 on it, so 
you owe another $120.  One day, you see in the paper that a new jewelry store is selling the same ring for only $110 as a 
special sale, and you can pay for it using layaway.  The new store is across the street from the old one.  If you decide to 
get the ring from the new store, you will not be able to get your money back from the old store, but you would save $10 
overall.     Would you be more likely to continue paying at the old store or buy from the new store?  
o Most likely to continue paying at the old store  (1)  
o More likely to continue paying at the old store  (2)  
o Likely to continue paying at the old store  (3)  
o Neutral  (4)  
o Likely to buy from the new store  (5)  
o More likely to buy from the new store  (6)  
o Most likely to buy from the new store  (7)  
 
Q6 You have been looking forward to this year’s Halloween party.  You have the right cape, the right wig, and the right 
hat.  All week, you have been trying to perfect the outfit by cutting out a large number of tiny stars to glue to the cape 
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and the hat, and you still need to glue them on.  On the day of Halloween, you decide that the outfit looks better 
without all these stars you have worked so hard on.  
  Would you be more likely to wear the stars or go without?  
o Most likely to wear the stars  (1)  
o More likely to wear the stars  (2)  
o Likely to wear the stars  (3)  
o Neutral  (4)  
o Likely to not wear the stars  (5)  
o More likely to not wear the stars  (6)  
o Most likely to not wear the stars  (7)  
 
 
Q7 You decide to learn to play a musical instrument.  After you buy an expensive cello, you find you are no longer 
interested.  Your neighbor is moving and you are excited that she is leaving you her old guitar, for free.  You’d like to 
learn how to play it.  
  Would you be more likely to practice the cello or the guitar?  
o Most likely to play cello  (1)  
o More likely to play cello  (2)  
o Likely to play cello  (3)  
o Neutral  (4)  
o Likely to play guitar  (5)  
o More likely to play guitar  (6)  
o Most likely to play guitar  (7)  
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Q8 You and your friend are at a movie theater together.  Both you and your friend are getting bored with the 
storyline.  You’d hate to waste the money spent on the ticket, but you both feel that you would have a better time at the 
coffee shop next door.  You could sneak out without other people noticing.  
  Would you be more likely to stay or to leave?     
o Most likely to stay  (1)  
o More likely to stay  (2)  
o Likely to stay  (3)  
o Neutral  (4)  
o Likely to leave  (5)  
o More likely to leave  (6)  
o Most likely to leave  (7)  
 
 
Q9 You and your friend have driven halfway to a resort.  Both you and your friend feel sick. You both feel that you both 
would have a much better weekend at home.  Your friend says it is "too bad" you already drove halfway, because you 
both would much rather spend the time at home.  You agree.      Would you be more likely to drive on or turn back?  
o Most likely to drive on  (1)  
o More likely to drive on  (2)  
o Likely to drive on  (3)  
o Neutral  (4)  
o Likely to turn back  (5)  
o More likely to turn back  (6)  
o Most likely to turn back  (7)  
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Q10 You are open to the experience of the present moment. 
o Never  (1)  
o Almost never  (2)  
o Infrequently  (3)  
o About half the time  (4)  
o Frequently  (5)  
o Almost always  (6)  
o Always  (7)  
 
 
Q11 When you experience a positive emotion, you know how to make it last. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Strongly agree  (7)  
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Q12 You are able to appreciate yourself. 
o Never  (1)  
o Almost never  (2)  
o Infrequently  (3)  
o About half the time  (4)  
o Frequently  (5)  
o Almost always  (6)  
o Always  (7)  
 
 
 
Q13 You are friendly to yourself when things go wrong. 
o Never  (1)  
o Almost never  (2)  
o Infrequently  (3)  
o About half the time  (4)  
o Frequently  (5)  
o Almost always  (6)  
o Always  (7)  
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Q14 Generally, you are determined in the situations you are in.   
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Strongly agree  (7)  
 
 
 
Q15 You experience moments of inner peace and ease, even when things get hectic and stressful. 
o Never  (1)  
o Almost never  (2)  
o Infrequently  (3)  
o About half the time  (4)  
o Frequently  (5)  
o Almost always  (6)  
o Always  (7)  
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Q16 When you want to feel more positive emotion, you change the way you’re thinking about the situation. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Strongly agree  (7)  
 
 
Q17 Generally, you feel enthusiastic about things around you.   
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Strongly agree  (7)  
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Q18 Some of the major events of your life have led you to re-evaluate what is important and not important.   
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Strongly agree  (7)  
 
 
Q19 You control your emotions by changing the way you think about the situation you’re in.  
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Strongly agree  (7)  
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Q20 When you notice an absence of mind, you gently return to the experience of the here and now. 
o Never  (1)  
o Almost never  (2)  
o Infrequently  (3)  
o About half the time  (4)  
o Frequently  (5)  
o Almost always  (6)  
o Always  (7)  
 
 
Q21 In difficult situations, you can pause without immediately reacting. 
o Never  (1)  
o Almost never  (2)  
o Infrequently  (3)  
o About half the time  (4)  
o Frequently  (5)  
o Almost always  (6)  
o Always  (7)  
 
 
83 
 
Q22 When you are in a positive mood, solving problems is easy for you. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Strongly agree  (7)  
 
 
Q23 Generally, you are ashamed of yourself.   
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Strongly agree  (7)  
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Q24 You motivate yourself by imagining a good outcome to tasks you take on. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Strongly agree  (7)  
 
 
Q25 You feel connected to your experience in the here-and-now. 
o Never  (1)  
o Almost never  (2)  
o Infrequently  (3)  
o About half the time  (4)  
o Frequently  (5)  
o Almost always  (6)  
o Always  (7)  
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Q26 When you want to feel less negative emotion, you change the way you’re thinking about the situation. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Strongly agree  (7)  
 
 
Q27 You expect good things to happen. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Strongly agree  (7)  
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Q28 Generally, you feel nervous about things around you.   
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Strongly agree  (7)  
 
 
Q29 You have control over your emotions. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Strongly agree  (7)  
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Q30 When you feel a change in emotions, you tend to come up with new ideas. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Strongly agree  (7)  
 
 
Q31 When you want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), you change what you’re thinking about. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Strongly agree  (7)  
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Q32 You pay attention to what’s behind your actions. 
o Never  (1)  
o Almost never  (2)  
o Infrequently  (3)  
o About half the time  (4)  
o Frequently  (5)  
o Almost always  (6)  
o Always  (7)  
 
 
Q33 Generally, you feel that you are proud of yourself.   
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Strongly agree  (7)  
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Q34 When you’re faced with a stressful situation, you make yourself think about it in a way that helps you stay calm. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Strongly agree  (7)  
 
 
Q35 When you want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), you change what you’re thinking about. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Strongly agree  (7)  
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Q36 Generally, you feel distressed about things around you.   
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Strongly agree  (7)  
 
 
Q37 When you are in a positive mood, you are able to come up with new ideas.    
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Strongly agree  (7)  
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Q38 You have high self-esteem.   
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Somewhat disagree  (3)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
o Somewhat agree  (5)  
o Agree  (6)  
o Strongly agree  (7)  
 
 
Q39 Who is the current U.S. president? 
o Barack Obama  (1)  
o Hillary Clinton  (2)  
o Donald Trump  (3)  
 
 
Q40 What was your personal income last year?  
o $0-14,999  (1)  
o $15,000-29,999  (2)  
o $30,000-59,999  (3)  
o $60,000+  (4)  
o Don’t know  (5)  
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Q41 What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
o Secondary school  (1)  
o High school graduate / technical or vocational training  (2)  
o Undergraduate study  (3)  
o University graduate  (4)  
o Postgraduate study  (5)  
o Decline to say  (6)  
 
 
Q42 How long have you ever practiced mindfulness meditation regularly?          
o Never or had practiced but soon discontinued  (1)  
o Less than three months  (2)  
o Three months but less than a year  (3)  
o A year but less than three years  (4)  
o Three years or more  (5)  
 
 
 
 
Q43 If you are satisfied with your selected answer choices, please click submit. 
 
End of Block: Default Question Block 
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Appendix-4 A priori calculation of required sample size from G*Power programme 
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Appendix-5 Tests of normality before and after the three outliers were excluded from the sunk cost / reappraisal bivariates
(i) N = 381
Descriptives
Statistic Std. Error
Mean 0.0000820 0.0513181
Lower Bound -0.1008210
Upper Bound 0.1009849
5% Trimmed Mean 0.0136931
Median -0.0605871
Variance 1.003
Std. Deviation 1.0016888
Minimum -3.41428
Maximum 2.50069
Range 5.91497
Interquartile Range 1.30855
Skewness -0.200 0.125
Kurtosis 0.411 0.249
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
Studentized Residual
0.034 381 .200
* 0.993 381 0.056
(ii) N = 378
Statistic Std. Error
0.0001732 0.0515159
Lower Bound -0.1011212
Upper Bound 0.1014677
0.0018166
-0.0819811
1.003
1.0015832
-2.73605
2.51971
5.25577
1.37771
0.008 0.125
-0.080 0.250
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
Studentized Residual
0.038 378 .200
* 0.996 378 0.385
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean
Studentized Residual
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
Shapiro-Wilk
Descriptives
Tests of Normality
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
Shapiro-Wilk
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Tests of Normality
Studentized Residual Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
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Appendix-6 Tests of normality before and after the three outliers were excluded from the sunk cost / EI bivariates
(i) N = 381
Descriptives
Statistic Std. Error
Mean -0.0000164 0.0513183
Lower Bound -0.1009197
Upper Bound 0.1008870
5% Trimmed Mean 0.0131202
Median -0.0571477
Variance 1.003
Std. Deviation 1.00169256
Minimum -3.44914
Maximum 2.52089
Range 5.97004
Interquartile Range 1.32095
Skewness -0.204 0.125
Kurtosis 0.448 0.249
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
Studentized 
Residual
0.037 381 .200
* 0.993 381 0.055
(ii) N = 378
Descriptives
Statistic Std. Error
0.0000878 0.0515130
Lower Bound -0.1012011
Upper Bound 0.1013767
0.0004935
-0.0725819
1.003
1.00152779
-2.72704
2.56738
5.29442
1.35730
0.015 0.125
-0.064 0.250
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
Studentized 
Residual
0.042 378 0.147 0.996 378 0.543
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
Shapiro-Wilk
Tests of Normality
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
Shapiro-Wilk
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Minimum
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean
Studentized 
Residual
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean
Maximum
Range
Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis
Tests of Normality
Studentized 
Residual
Mean
5% Trimmed Mean
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Appendix-7 Calculations from G*Power 3.1.9.2 programme
(i) Post-hoc probing of achieved power for the current study
(ii) A priori calculation of required sample size for future research
